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Recently there have been increased interests in looking at Singapore’s 
history from different perspectives. For decades the State has been the sole 
gatekeeper in guarding the national historical narrative. Critics pointed out that the 
historical narrative is skewered heavily on the side of the victor while the voices 
and stories of the vanquished are silenced. This thesis will be focusing on one part 
of Singapore’s history which is on the 1964 Racial Riots which occurred against a 
highly charged political backdrop in the postcolonial early-1960s. 
The aim of this thesis is to deconstruct the historical narrative on the Riots. 
It is to uncover how the Riot is being remembered and what are the underlying 
reasons as to why it is being remembered in such ways. This thesis will 
problematize this notion by not just looking at it as a simple binary of ethnic 
differences between the Malays and Chinese but venturing beyond that by looking 
at portrayals of the Riot from various perspectives such as the State, PAP Old 
Guards, the secondary sources done on the Riot, the grassroots, UMNO leaders 
and official accounts from other countries. The thesis will identify the 
incongruencies between the different perspectives and identify some problems 






 It is not hard for me to see why a lot of younger Singaporeans find 
Singapore history not an interesting topic worth studying or researching on. Having 
spent a total of twelve years in public school myself, I find that the curriculum on 
Singapore history is unilinear and adopted an uncritical approach in uncovering 
the various perspectives on the different aspects of Singapore’s history. It was 
only upon being an undergraduate in NUS that I realized that there are scores of 
alternative historical narratives which are sidelined or silenced to accommodate 
the dominant accounts on Singapore’s history. A lecturer from the NUS History 
Department once said that if a Martian is to land on Singapore and be given a 
school textbook to read up on, he will most probably think that there are only two 
figures which featured in Singapore’s history, namely Sir Stamford Raffles and Lee 
Kuan Yew! I grew up believing in the authoritative account of The Singapore Story 
but as I pored through the history books in the library and the various types of 
sources in the archives, I realized that there are multiple versions of the Singapore 
Stories that existed. It is with this spirit of inquisitiveness that had led me to 
embark on writing a thesis in laying out the different types of narratives pertaining 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1. Introduction 
On 21st July 1964, contingents from different Muslim organizations and political 
parties marched from Padang to the Jamiyah Headquarters located at Geylang 
Lorong 12. The procession marched in an orderly manner but violence erupted 
when they reached Kallang. Nobody really knew what was the catalyst that 
sparked the riot. Some accounts blamed a Chinese onlooker who threw a bottle 
into the procession, while another claimed that it was due to a Chinese policeman 
being beaten up by some straggling members of the procession who were told to 
get back in line1. The violence soon spread to neighbouring areas like Geylang 
Serai, Kampong Kembangan and Kampong Chai Chee. A curfew was declared 
later in the evening and the Federal Army from Malaysia was called to Singapore 
to restore order. Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak came to 
Singapore and toured the affected areas with Lee Kuan Yew. Razak was the 
Acting Prime Minister then, as Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was away on 
an official trip to the United States. Five days later, the Goodwill Committees led 
by Malay and Chinese village leaders were formed in all the constituencies with 
the aim of allaying the fears of villagers, as well as mending the trust between 
Singaporeans of different ethnic groups 2 . Nearly two months later on 3rd 
September 1964, the fatal stabbing of a Malay trishaw rider in Geylang Serai led to 
a second racial riot which resulted in 13 dead3.  
                                               
1Conceicao, J. (2007). Singapore and the Many-headed Monster: A Look at Racial Riots Against a Socio-historical 
Ground. Singapore: Horizon Books. p. 89. 
2Josey, A. (1980). Lee Kuan Yew: the crucial years. Singapore: Times Books International. p. 210. 
3Lau, A. (1998). A moment of anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the politics of disengagement. Singapore: Times 




2. Dominant Discourse 
The official narrative on Singapore’s history has been dominated by the accounts 
of the founding fathers of the Republic. As Loh Kah Seng had observed; 
“Official initiatives like National Education, introduced in 1997, draw selectively 
from Singapore’s history to formulate sustained themes like the country’s 
“vulnerability” and the need for “communitarial values”. ... The most compelling 
chapter of the “Singapore Story”, that dealing with the 1950s and 1960s, has been 
authorized primarily by the personal experiences of the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) Old Guard.”4 
The Riot5 represents a unique case study in Singapore history as it was a major 
outbreak of violence in Singapore which was attributed by the dominant discourse 
to a combination of political and racial tension. The dominant discourse on the 
Riots has mostly been that of the State’s discourse which framed the Riots in 
racial terms. The official narrative from the State portrayed the outbreak of the 
Riots as resulting from an explosion of racial tension which was stoked by 
elements of Malay racial chauvinists within UMNO. 
Kwa Chong Guan, Derek Heng and Tan Tai Yong co-authored the book 
“Singapore: A 700-Year History- From Early Emporium to World City” which traced 
the history of Singapore from the time of Sang Nila Utama to the post-Cold War 
period. The book can be said to represent the official history of Singapore as it 
was published by the National Archives of Singapore and even has a foreword by 
the then-Minister for Ministry of Communications, Information and the Arts. In the 
                                               
4Loh, K. S. (1998). Within the Singapore story: the use and narrative of history in Singapore. Crossroads, 12(2), 1-21. p. 
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section on the 1964 Racial Riots, the authors blamed the Malay extremists within 
UMNO such as their Secretary-General Syed Jaafar Albar who instigated 
Singapore Malays by whipping up their communal and religious emotions in 
carrying out a sustained anti-Lee Kuan Yew campaign during that period. They 
aimed to destabilize multiracial PAP and replace it with communal based parties6. 
The authors also explicitly blamed the Malay extremists for starting the Riot by 
backing it up with evidences in the form of quotations by Othman Wok, the 
Western diplomatic corps and even the Malaysian Permanent Secretary for the 
Ministry of Interior7.    
Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew’s biographer, explicitly highlighted the fact that an 
atmosphere charged with tension was being created by racial exhortations uttered 
by UMNO politicians and given prominence in news outlet like Utusan Melayu8. 
Josey also quoted from Lee, who said that “All the indications show that there has 
been organization and planning behind this outbreak to turn it into an ugly 
communal clash. All that was needed was somebody to trigger it off”9. In his 
memoir, Lee placed the events on the 1964 Racial Riots under a Chapter titled 
“Albar stokes up Malay Passions”10. As the Chapter suggests, Lee placed the 
blame squarely on what he perceived as a dangerous and reckless group of Malay 
extremists within UMNO led by Albar, who purposely played the communal card in 
instigating the Singapore Malays against PAP, which eventually culminated in the 
outbreak of the Riots. Instances of such actions include Albar giving a fiery speech 
                                               
6Kwa, C. G., Heng, D., & Tan, T. Y. (Eds.) (2009). Singapore : a 700-year history : from early emporium to world 
city. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore. p. 176. 
7Ibid. p. 177. 
8Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, p. 210. 
9Ibid. p. 210. 





attacking Lee and the PAP in the Singapore United Malay National Organization 
(SUMNO) Convention in Pasir Panjang in July 196411. What was distinctive in his 
memoir was that Lee portrayed the Riots as one of the bleakest chapters in 
Singapore’s history by noting that “racial passions had been aroused and mayhem 
had broken loose”12.  
Amongst the official accounts, the outbreak of the Riots was seen as a result of a 
sustained campaign by racial chauvinists from UMNO who targeted Lee and the 
PAP, which was aimed at oppressing and exploiting the Malays in Singapore. The 
outbreak of the Riots was seen as the climax of this racist campaign, which had by 
then sufficiently whipped up the Singapore Malays into an emotional frenzy. This 
line of argument became the official narrative in Singapore as well as the dominant 
discourse on the 1964 Racial Riots.   
3. Secondary Sources 
There were studies which were done on broad-based themes pertaining to 
Singapore’s history in general such as those by Mary Turnbull but there were also 
studies focusing on the Riots. These can broadly be categorized as those that 
reinforce the dominant discourse by providing evidences and narratives that 
support the discourse on the 1964 Racial Riots.  
3.1. Reinforcing the Dominant Discourse 
The works of Michael Leifer were commonly cited as he was one of the earliest 
works on the Riots 13 . Leifer was an esteemed scholar in Southeast Asian 
International Relations and one of his areas of interests was in the domain of 
                                               
11Ibid. p. 554. 
12Ibid. p. 558. 




power and security. He published his findings shortly after the Riots subsided and 
was thorough in chronologically listing down the details of the Riots. He 
meticulously pieced together the events preceding the Riots as well as what 
happened on that fateful day. Leifer placed strong emphasis in pointing at the 
PAP-UMNO political conflict as the main cause for the Riots. However unlike the 
dominant discourse on the Riots, he did not focus too much on the racial causes of 
the Riots. Instead, he systematically argued that the nature of the communal 
politics during the time brought about an environment which was ripe for an 
outbreak of racial violence.   
Foo Kim Leng wrote an honours dissertation on the Riots, where she looked at 
specific themes around the event itself. Foo’s approach in chronologically 
narrating on the Riots is similar to Leifer’s study. However, since Foo undertook 
her research some nearly fifteen years after the Riots broke out, she included in 
her study the aftermath, effects and legacy from the Riots. Chan Heng Chee and 
Mohd Azhar Terimo wrote academic exercises on the PAP and SUMNO 
respectively. Chan’s study focuses on PAP’s early years in power as the 
government of a sovereign Singapore. However, her study did cover on the period 
when Singapore was part of Malaysia. Chan analyzed the political tension 
between PAP and UMNO and how this tension eventually culminated in the 
outbreak of the Riots. Azhar studied the history of SUMNO, chronologically 
narrating the history of the party from its creation to its eventual demise. He 
highlighted the key figures within SUMNO and meticulously charted out its highs 
and lows, which included the violent episode of the Riots. Albert Lau was 
privileged to be granted extensive access to foreign archival documents as well as 




on what transpired during Singapore’s ill fated merger period with Malaysia and 
the subsequent separation. He provided an insiders’ peek into the backroom 
dealings between leaders from both sides. He was able to vividly highlight 
accounts of the Riots based on the security archive documents which he 
researched on.  
The academic exercises by Azhar, Chan and Foo as well as the book written by 
Lau presented the Riots within a systematic set of framework. There was a great 
deal of emphasis to make sure that the arguments or statements were 
corroborated with hard evidences such as newspapers and archival records. 
Similar to Leifer, all four presented their study by having the PAP-UMNO conflict 
as the dominant theme in the background of their research.  
There are biographies of political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, Ya’acob 
Mohamed, S Rajaratnam and Goh Keng Swee which were written decades after 
1964 which shed light into the perception of these leaders on the Riots. The most 
notable amongst them is Lee Kuan Yew’s memoir which devoted an entire chapter 
on the Riots. Interestingly, the chapter on the Riots was titled “Albar Stokes Up 
Malay Passions”, as he was adamant that Syed Jaafar Albar and the UMNO Ultras 
bore full responsibility for the Riots. Being a prominent and influential elder 
statesman in Singapore, Lee’s account is very important as his views dominate the 
views of others and influenced the State’s narrative on Singapore history.  
Nordin Sopiee did a comprehensive study on secessionist movements within the 
different states in the Federation of Malaysia. He compared and contrasted 
Singapore’s failed project to be part of the Federation of Malaysia with that of the 




reason as to why Singapore was the only state which seceded from the Federation 
was due to the intense politicking by the politicians. The Riots thoroughly shocked 
the politicians from both camps and when the politicking between PAP and UMNO 
leaders resumed in 1965, Nordin noted that Tunku realized that Singapore had to 
be expelled from the Federation to prevent potential bloodshed as well as to 
safeguard stability in both countries.  
The works of Azhar, Chan, Lau, and Nordin were rather different from Lee’s 
memoir which supports the dominant discourse on the 1964 Racial Riots. They 
were more systematic and thematic in analyzing the Riots even though all the 
accounts presented the PAP-UMNO conflict as the central focus of their research. 
Azhar is analyzing the Riots from a larger study of SUMNO and Chan is doing the 
same for the PAP during its early period in political wilderness. Nordin and Lau is 
looking at the Riots as one of the contributing factors that eventually culminated in 
Singapore’s separation from Malaysia. To a large degree, they agree that the 
outbreak of the Riots was due to the tense politicking between PAP and UMNO 
over racial-based issues. The conflict between the politicians resulted in spillovers 
to the general masses in the form of emotional agitations which eventually 
culminated in the Riots.  
3.2. Providing Alternative Accounts 
There are however scholars who provided alternative accounts on the 1964 Racial 
Riots. These scholars did not confine themselves merely to the common themes 
within the dominant discourse such as the PAP-UMNO political conflict or that the 




the study on the Riots by shedding new perspectives on other approaches to 
better understand the Riots.   
The role of Indonesia was often underplayed in the dominant discourse. The 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia was frowned upon by neighbouring 
countries such as Indonesia. They viewed Malaysia with suspicion, calling it a 
colonial construct designed purely to mantain British’s de facto presence in the 
region by using the Federation as a proxy14. Sukarno launched the Konfrontasi 
campaign to create instability in the Federation through the use of covert saboteur 
attacks and psychological warfare15. There were evidences that Sukarno incited 
racial tension between the Chinese and the Malay communities as part of the 
Konfrontasi plot. D. A. Hyde was a former British communist who had spent some 
time in Southeast Asia as well. His book “Confrontation in the East” 16  was a 
comprehensive study on Indonesia’s Konfrontasi campaign. Hyde managed to 
extricate countless evidences of Indonesia’s complicity in fermenting interracial 
tension in Singapore. His research contributed a strong Indonesian dimension to 
the context of the Riots. Willard A. Hanna’s “The Singapore Infantry Regiment”17, 
on the other hand was a study focusing on the early years of the Singapore Armed 
Forces. Hanna was an experienced diplomat serving in the United States Foreign 
Service and joined the American Universities Field Staff upon completion of his 
tour of duty. He also wrote extensively on Malaysia and Indonesia. The Riots was 
framed as being one of the critical factors which contributed to the need for 
Singapore to build up its own Armed Forces, free of any external influences. Apart 
from the military aspect, he did describe details of the Riots in the first few pages 
                                               
14Turnbull, C. M. (2009). A history of modern Singapore, 1819-2005.Singapore: NUS Press. p. 282. 
15Hyde, D. A. (1965). Confrontation in the East. London: Bodley Head. p. 87. 
16Ibid.  




of his study. He noted that the “Malay malcontents and Chinese gangsters, some 
of them almost certainly working as paid Indonesian agents, played a major role in 
sparking dozens of widely scattered incidents of stoning, slashing and stabbing”18. 
This supported Hyde’s many arguments and evidences illustrating the Indonesia’s 
deep involvement in the Riots. Both Hyde and Hanna had spent a considerable 
amount of time in Singapore and Malaysia and were in the thick of the action 
during the heady period of the 1950s and 1960s. Even though these men were not 
locals, they were in a privileged position and most probably had close contacts 
that were able to feed them with information from the ground. They wrote in a 
journalistic manner, in a narrative style peppered with generous amount of details. 
Stanley Bedlington studied the development of the Malays and the challenges they 
faced during those heady periods in the 1950s and 1960s. According to his 
findings, the legacy of the Riots was institutionalized in later years when the loyalty 
of the Malays in Singapore was questioned and in playing it safe, Malays were 
gradually phased out in security apparatuses and high government positions. For 
scholars like Bedlington, he was able to raise issues such as on the loyalty of the 
Malays by having access to contacts at high positions. He was thus privy to 
information which was not officially acknowledged in public. There is therefore a 
revised study of the positionality of Malays in security apparatuses and high 
government positions and Bedlington’s work showed the legacy of the Riots as 
well as its impact on the Singapore Malay community in the later generations.  
The Riots were also revisited by revisionist historians. Loh Kah Seng belonged to 
a new breed of young Singaporean historians who problematized Singapore’s 
                                               




dominant historical framework and critically analyzed the rationale behind the 
pursuance of such a linear national historiography. The Riots were part of a larger 
study in the critical re-examination of the dominant discourse on Singapore’s 
history. The discourse highlighted themes such as the country’s “vulnerability”, the 
existence of the presence of “external dangers” and “domestic fault lines”. Loh 
highlighted how the Riots fitted in nicely within the larger dominant history 
narrative, which also includes other case studies such as the Hock Lee Bus Riot in 
the Konfrontasi period and threats posed by Leftists such as Lim Chin Siong. 
Therefore it is necessary to revisit the Riots and analyze the accounts from the 
different parties to investigate to what extent is the dominant account either 
congruent or incongruent with the alternative narratives on the Riots.   
Ganesan Narayanan analyzed how the Riots were being used by the State as a 
form of historical precedent which the State utilized in dealing with future cases of 
racial and religious chauvinists. The tough policies against these chauvinists are 
justified in the name of preventing an outbreak of violence in Singapore, and past 
incidents such as the Riots are constantly evoked to highlight how easily situations 
on the ground can deteriorate as a result of the reckless actions of these 
chauvinists. One problem in framing the Riots in such a reductivist manner is 
having the State to use the accounts of the Riots as a tool in justifying some of its 
policies and institutions.  
The secondary literatures which provided alternative accounts of the Riots had a 
different approach in studying the Riots. Some scholars such as Narayanan and 




in the dominant discourse. They argued that it was politically advantageous for the 
State to support the dominant discourse on the Riots.    
3.3. Analyzing Studies on other Riots during the Period 
During the heady days of the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore was rocked by series of 
riots and demonstrations such as the Hock Lee Bus Riot, Chinese Middle School 
Riot and Maria Hertogh Riot. Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow 
even candidly noted that by 1955, “Singapore went strike crazy witnessing 260 
labour stoppages and walk-offs”19. There were many studies done on these riots 
and the approaches adopted by the different authors in analyzing these riots were 
studied to see if this thesis can adopt a similar strategy in problematizing the 1964 
Racial Riots. 
The 1964 Racial Riot was not the first large scale outbreak of inter-ethnic violence 
in Singapore. There was the Maria Hertogh Riot in 1950 which broke out due to a 
legal tussle for the custody of Maria Hertogh between her Dutch biological parents 
and her Indonesian adoptive mother. There were published works done on the 
incident such as historical novels by Fatini Ya’acob and Haja Maideen. Syed 
Muhamad Khairudin Aljunied in his study on the Riots focused on the colonial 
British government’s management of the incident, as well as the reactions by the 
local communities to the actions of the colonial officials. The approach adopted by 
Aljunied can be used in analyzing the 1964 Racial Riots as well, by studying how 
the Singapore PAP government and the Alliance Federal government jointly 
                                               




handled the incident, such as by analyzing the steps the two governments took in 
diffusing the tension on the ground20.   
Goh Hwee Jiang’s academic exercise on the Hock Lee Bus Riot in 1955 studied 
how an industrial relation dispute escalated into a large-scale anti-colonial militant 
campaign. Goh traced how the Leftist elements in Singapore infiltrated the 
Chinese-medium schools and trade unions and synergized them into an organized 
political force against the government21. For the study on the 1964 Racial Riots, 
this thesis will look at other forms of external infiltrations designed to instigate the 
people on the ground. The evidence from secondary sources point to external 
agents such as Indonesian saboteurs and racial chauvinists who plotted in 
fermenting interracial tension in Singapore by means of covert and open 
instigations.    
The May 13 Incident which broke out in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 broke out largely 
due to inter-ethnic tensions caused by politicians who jostled hard to win the 
support of the masses. This was similar to the reasons provided by the dominant 
discourse on the causes of the 1964 Racial Riots in Singapore. In both cases the 
political atmosphere between the two competing political sides was tense and 
often very emotive. In the May 13th Incident, the riot broke out against the 
backdrop of the tightly contested 1969 Federal Election between United Malay 
National Organization (UMNO)-led Alliance and the Chinese based Democratic 
Action Party (DAP). Although the background events leading up to the riot proved 
similar to that of the Riots in 1964, Kua Kia Soong who did a study on the May 13 
                                               
20Aljunied, S. A. (2009). Colonialism, violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia: the Maria Hertogh controversy and its 
aftermath. London; New York: Routledge.    





riot based on declassified British documents however claimed that in the case of 
the May 13 Incident, there was meticulous planning behind the riot by members of 
the Malay capitalist class who were disenfranchised with the policies of Tunku. He 
categorically ruled out the riot being spontaneous in nature and said that it was in 
fact a coup d'état22. In contrast, the 1964 Racial Riots was not a coup d'état; 
however this thesis will still investigate the possibility of the existence of any 
individual or group who could have systematically plotted the riot to further their 
own agenda. According to the dominant discourse, it was the Ultras who 
meticulously plotted the outbreak of the Riots in order to create instability in 
Singapore and discredit the PAP government for being inept in maintaining 
stability in Singapore. This line of argument will be problematized in this thesis.  
4. Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to uncover the different perspectives and narratives on the 
1964 Racial Riots from different groups, as well as to identify the reasons as to 
why there are incongruencies between the different accounts. The hypothesis for 
this research is that the Riots represents more than the State’s discourse of a uni-
causal case of violence due to Malay-Chinese conflict. The discourse on the Riots 
is dominated by that of the State’s accounts which focus on the PAP-UMNO 
tension and the existence of deep-seated ethnic fault lines in Singapore which 
silenced alternative accounts on the Riots.  
There is also no cross-comparative analysis of the different perceptions of the 
Riots from various groups such as from scholars, politicians, elites, non-officials 
and grassroots. As mentioned in the earlier part, existing scholarly studies on the 
                                               
22Kua, K. S. (2007). May 13: Declassified documents on the Malaysian riots of  1969. Kuala Lumpur: Suaram 




Riots can be categorized as those that support the dominant discourse on the 
Riots and those that provide alternative accounts of the Riots. Scholars such as 
Hyde for example, pointed the blame at Indonesians for instigating inter-ethnic 
tensions in Singapore through their Konfrontasi campaign by categorically laying 
out all the evidences to support his claim. Narayanan, on the other hand, pointed 
out that the State has a political agenda in propagating the dominant discourse on 
the Riots. The dominant discourse on the Riots blamed the racial chauvinists 
within UMNO as the main instigator of the outbreak of violence in 1964. Thus it 
would be pertinent for this thesis to analyze the accounts of the Riots by the 
Alliance leaders in order to get alternative views other than that Accounts by 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Khir Johari will be studied in 
understanding the Riots from the viewpoint of the Malaysian political leaders. This 
thesis will also look at the accounts by Western diplomatic corps, as they provide a 
third-party perspective on the Riots. There were diplomatic cables which were sent 
from their Singapore and Kuala Lumpur missions back to their capitals to report on 
the Riots. These diplomats often had access to both Singapore’s and Malaysia’s 
political leaders thus they were privy to insider information at the highest level. 
These sources will be examined to determine whether there can be other 
alternative perspectives to understand the Riots.    
Amongst the current literature available on the Riots, there are no in-depth studies 
done to uncover the voices from the ground. Most of the works on the Riots focus 
on the dominant figures during the period. The dominant discourse on the Riots 
revolves around the accounts by the elites, the senior members of PAP. Even the 
scholars who provided alternative accounts of the Riots did not cover the accounts 




the ground by means of oral history. The groups targeted are those that had lived 
through the period and did not hold any leadership role in any of the political 
parties during that period.  
Based on evidences from the ground, the main hypothesis of this study is that 
firstly the Riot was not planned by any group, but it was sparked spontaneously by 
rogue elements such as street corner gangs, secondly the Riot was a localized act 
of mob violence concentrated in southeastern part of Singapore and most 
importantly contrary to the dominant discourse, the interracial relationship amongst 
those on the ground was stable even during the height of the rioting period. This 
begs the question whether future politics in Singapore and the out of bound 
markers for discussions on sensitive issues must necessarily be predicated on the 
management of “ethnic fault lines”, when in fact everyday experience and people-
to-people dynamics actually display more inter-ethnic conviviality than tension. 
This thesis will do a comparative study on both the dominant discourse on the 
Riots as well as other accounts on the Riots by the different groups to identify the 
incongruencies between the different narratives. One important contribution from 
this thesis is to examine accounts at the grassroots level which is one of the most 
underexplored groups in studies done on the Riot. As most of the accounts on the 
1964 Racial Riots were given in a top-down approach, the narratives in this thesis 








5.1. Nature of the Language of the Sources 
In this study, I attempted to be exhaustive in my usage of sources pertaining to the 
Riots. However the omission of Chinese-medium sources represents a major 
limitation in this study. Its limitations lie in exceeding the total word count in this 
thesis with the inclusion of Chinese medium sources. My sources are therefore 
limited to either those in English or Malay language. The findings mainly focus on 
the perceptions of the Malay community of the 1964 Racial Riots, especially in the 
Chapter which looks at the popular views of the Riots from those at the grassroots 
level.     
5.2. Primary Sources 
5.2.1. Interviews of Individuals at the Grassroots Level 
There were a total of forty subjects with varying profiles in terms of age, gender, 
occupation and locality. The occupational profile of the subjects in 1964 includes 
amongst others, school teachers, students, policemen, housewives, labourers, 
religious leaders and businessmen. There were a total of twenty-nine male 
subjects and eleven female subjects and in terms of their locality, fourteen of them 
lived in the hotspot areas in the southeastern part of Singapore, in areas such as 
Geylang and Kallang, while twenty-six of them resided in the non-hotspot areas in 
other parts of Singapore. Twelve of the subjects were interviewed and the 
accounts of the remaining twenty-eight were obtained from oral recordings from 




For the face-to-face interviews, a total of twelve subjects were selected of which 
there were ten males and two females23. To further safeguard the welfare of the 
subjects involved, the subjects were given a set of sample interview questions as 
a guide and a participant information sheet. For the benefit of the majority of the 
subjects who were not proficient in English Language, the participation information 
sheet as well as the the questions were translated into Malay Language. All twelve 
subjects were interviewed face-to-face and the interviews were recorded using a 
digital voice recorder. The recordings were translated and transcribed at a later 
date. Only the author of this thesis and his supervisor has complete full access to 
the data. The subjects were selected based on the fact that they had lived through 
the period of the Riots and were able to recall the events leading up to the 
outbreak of violence as well as what had happened in the immediate period 
preceeding it. As the interviews will contribute to the Chapter in this thesis which 
deals with the accounts of the people on the ground, the subjects need to be from 
those at the grassroots level during that period. The subjects selected were those 
that were neither an active leader nor member of any political parties during that 
period. Recruitment of subjects was done based on personal contacts of the 
author as well as by emailing those who were identified as being appropriately part 
of this group.   
As for the oral interview recordings selected from the National Archives, there 
were a total of twenty-eight subjects of which there were nineteen male subjects 
and nine female subjects. Similar to the criteria of the people being interviewed, 
these accounts were selected on the basis of their recollection of the Riots and 
                                               




them being part of those at the grassroots level during the period. The oral 
recordings are accessible to members of the public from the National Archives.  
5.2.2. Interviews & Speeches by Political Leaders 
Most of the primary sources used in this thesis were obtained from the National 
Archives Singapore, National University of Singapore (NUS) Central Library and 
the Singapore National Library Board (NLB). There was a comprehensive 
collection of official speeches made by Lee Kuan Yew on the 1964 Racial Riots by 
National Archives. There were also audio and video home system cassette (VHS) 
recordings of the political leaders from both sides of the Causeway on the Riots. 
These include recordings of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Khir Johari and of Lee 
Kuan Yew on the incident. There was also a set of oral interview commissioned by 
the National Archives specifically on the 1964 Racial Riots in the form of VHS 
recording of interviews with PAP Malay leaders Othman Wok and Bulat Hamid in 
2005 which gave a detailed and vivid account of the Riots from both of them.  
5.2.3. Autobiographies and Biographies of Political Leaders  
I also made use of autobiographies, biographies and authorized biographies of the 
political leaders during that period which were obtained from the NUS Central 
Library and the NLB. There were biographies on the political leaders on both sides 
of the Causeway written years or decades after 1964 which shed light into the 
perception of these leaders on the Riots. The most notable is Lee Kuan Yew’s 
memoir which devoted an entire chapter on the Riots and is integral in defining the 





5.2.4. Newspaper Collections 
The NUS Central Library has compiled a collection of newspaper articles from The 
Straits Times pertaining to the Riots, from the events leading up to the Riots to the 
aftermath of the second racial riot in September 1964. Newspapers such as Berita 
Harian, Malay Mail, Malayan Times, Sunday Gazette, The Straits Echo, The 
Sunday Mail and Utusan Melayu were obtained from NLB microfilm newspaper 
collection. Apart from being an important primary source in mapping out the 
detailed chain of events on the Riots, newspapers also reported on what the 
politicians had to say on the Riots. 
5.2.5. Diplomatic Cables 
There were some official cablegrams and telegrams which were exchanged 
between high commissioners and ambassadors stationed in the Federation with 
their respective home governments concerning the Riots which have already been 
declassified. Countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Australia 
made their diplomatic cables during that period available, either in hardcopies 
such as microfilms in National Archives and the NUS Central Library or via the 
internet. The files from which these cables were obtained from include Australian 
Internal Security File Number 204/2/3, British Government File DO 187/48 and a 
United States Intelligence note from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The 
official sets of cablegrams and telegrams which were used in this thesis were 
either obtained via the internet such as from Australia’s National Archives or from 
various sources within Singapore such as the National Archives Singapore, the 




5.2.6. Secondary Sources 
For secondary sources, I made use of the historical narratives written on the Riots. 
These secondary sources are in the form of published books, journal articles and 
academic exercises.  The works of Michael Leifer, Willard A. Hanna and Douglas 
Arnold Hyde were often cited as they were one of the earliest scholars who had 
researched on the Riots. Academic exercises from Foo Kim Leng, Chan Heng 
Chee and Mohd Azhar Terimo greatly assisted in looking at specific themes 
hoovering on the Riots itself.  Stanley Bedlington studied the development of the 
Malays and the challenges they faced during those heady periods of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Nordin compared and contrasted Singapore’s failed project to be part 
of the Federation of Malaysia with that of the secessionist movements in other 
states within the Federation. Albert Lau was privileged to be granted extensive 
access to foreign archival documents as well as sensitive files from the Singapore 
Special Branch to compile a detailed narrative on what transpired during 
Singapore’s ill fated merger period with Malaysia and the separation subsequently. 
Loh Kah Seng belonged to the revisionist group of young Singaporean historians 
who problematized Singapore’s dominant historical framework and critically 
analyzed the rationale behind the pursuance of such a linear national 
historiography.  
6. Methdology 
The aim of this thesis is to uncover multiple voices irrespective of the Riots, 
especially from the marginalised voices of those ordinary people. This thesis will 





The inputs from the grassroots subjects included in this research play an integral 
role in identifying how the Riots was being perceived and remembered from the 
ground. However, as almost all of the interviews were conducted from the 1980s 
onwards, the gap of two decades or more between the time the Riots took place 
and the time the interviews were conducted may raise questions of reliability. The 
subjects may not have accurately recounted the facts pertaining to the Riots due 
to the significant lapse of time since the actual incident. Nevertheless, according to 
Lim How Seng; 
“For those who did not write their memoirs or autobiographies, we shall in the 
future be able to address their role in the past through the taped interviews. In 
many cases, the oral history record may be the only record that we have.”24 
Thus we must not completely discount the value of such interviews despite the 
limitations. Elite historical narratives ought to be democratized by incorporating the 
voices of those at the grassroots level, as the voices from the ground are often 
drowned out by the dominant figures during the period. There are hardly any 
written records on them such as in the form of autobiographies, as they are 
considered peripheral figures of history. In the absence of written records, the best 
and often times the only way to recover their voices is via oral sources. 
Analysis of the accounts by the Malaysian leaders reveals that the Riot was not a 
popular topic to be included in the biographies of Malaysian politicians during the 
period. There was barely any mention of the Riots at all, probably because the 
                                               
24 Lim, H. S. (1998). Interviewing the business and political elites of Singapore: methods and problems. IN Lim, P. P. 
H., Morrison, J. H., & Kwa, C. G. (Eds.). Oral history in Southeast Asia: theory and method. (pp. 55-




incident may be deemed as not as important as other historical incidents in 
Malaysia’s history, such as the May 13 Incident.   
The diplomatic cables on the other hand give us insight into what the foreign 
diplomats thought of the Riots. They are candid assessments of the Riots by third-
party foreign observers. They enabled us to witness the backroom dealings 
between the key Singaporean and Malaysian political figures as the diplomats had 
access to exclusive sources. They were also privy to sources concerning the 
security conditions on the ground and provided a meticulous account of the Riots 
as when it happened.      
7. Chapter Outline 
In this thesis, the various Chapters will identify the perceptions and portrayals of 
the Riots from different groups.  
Chapter 2 on ‘Revisiting the Riots: Analyzing the Secondary Sources’ deals with 
secondary literatures done on the Riots which include journal articles, books and 
academic exercises. There are a number of works written on the Riots which trace 
out a chronological account of the incident. There are also secondary literatures 
which focus on specific themes on the Riots such as the PAP-UMNO conflict, the 
Konfrontasi threat, the role of the Chinese Secret Societies and the legacy of the 
Riots. The secondary literatures can be categorized into two groups, namely those 
that support the dominant discourse and those that provide an alternative take on 
the Riots. By gathering and comparing these accounts, this chapter attempts to 
show a multi-perspective analysis of the Riots which will provide a more holistic 




Chapter 3 on ‘The Authoritative Narrative? Accounts from the PAP Old Guards’ 
presents the accounts of the Riots from the perspectives of the first generation 
leaders from the PAP. Accounts of the Riots by Singapore’s founding Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew will be studied by analyzing his speeches, biography and 
memoirs. These will constitute the primary sources to be used in this study in 
analyzing Lee’s views on the Riots. The chapter will also look at the views of Lee’s 
party colleagues such as Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin Chye, Othman Wok 
and Ya’acob Mohamed amongst others. Some of their views on the Riots were 
captured during the immediate days after the Riots, and some were recorded as 
late as in the 1990s. Lee’s account on the Riots is integral to this thesis as it 
corresponds with the State’s narrative on the Riots which also represents the 
dominant discourse. This chapter will identify whether there are any shifts in their 
views over time as well as analyzing any incongruency in accounts between the 
Old Guards.    
Chapter 4 on ‘Voices from the Ground: Accounts from the Grassroots’ deals with 
the accounts narrated by those at the grassroots level who lived through the Riots. 
None of the respondents from the interviews and oral recordings held any 
leadership positions in any of the political parties during the period. This particular 
Chapter is important in the study of the 1964 Racial Riots as there is no extensive 
study done in specifically looking at the views of those at the grassroots level. The 
evidences from the accounts would be used to compare with that of the dominant 
discourse to interrogate the top-down historiography on the Riots. The findings 





Chapter 5 on ‘Alternative Versions: Accounts by Alliance Leaders and Foreign 
Government Officials’ consists of accounts from diplomats, Malaysian political 
leaders and leaders of the Singapore Alliance. Materials researched on included 
oral recordings from the National Archives, published records of diplomatic cables, 
newspaper articles, as well as books and studies done on these officials. The 
accounts from the diplomats provided a candid assessment of the situation on the 
ground, as they came from diplomats who relayed confidential reports on the Riots 
back to their home government. Accounts from members of the Malaysian and 
Singapore Alliance leaders present a different side to the dominant discourse 
which exclusively blamed them for the outbreak of the 1964 Racial Riots. This 
Chapter presents an array of accounts from the different individuals in official 
capacities during that period. Their accounts are useful in analyzing and 
interrogating the dominant discourse on the Riots.    
Chapter 6 deals with the overall assessment on the perceptions of the Riots by the 
different groups examined in the different Chapters. As there is no single work that 
presents the different accounts of the Riots together in the same study, the 
findings from this thesis will be able to clearly identify the incongruencies between 
the different accounts and do a cross-comparative analysis. It will also highlight 
the new findings which emerged from this thesis, chiefly the voices of those at the 
grassroots level which are often absent in studies on 1964 Racial Riot to 
underscore the need for a critical reassessment of the dominant discourse on the 





CHAPTER 2: REVISITING THE RIOT: ANALYZING THE 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
1. Introduction 
The Riot is a unique event in Singapore’s history, involving sensitive issues such 
as racial violence and the PAP-UMNO conflict. There are fewer studies done on 
the Riots in comparison to other events in Singapore’s history during the period 
such as the Maria Hertogh Riot and the threats posed by the Leftists. Over the 
years, many more studies have been done on the Maria Hertogh Riot, which was 
also a religious-fuelled riot. Michael Leifer, Willard A. Hanna and Douglas Arnold 
Hyde were one of the earliest to have written an in-depth account of what had 
transpired during the Riots. Subsequently over the years there were accounts in 
journals and academic exercises which revisited the Riots.  
2. Accounts by Secondary Sources on the Causes of the 1964 Racial Riots 
2.1. Political Tension 
Singapore’s brief foray in the Malaysian Federation was marked by bitter rivalry 
between PAP and the UMNO-led Alliance coalition. The Riots was to some extent 
an inevitable climax to the series of political rivalries between the two that led to a 
heightened sense of racial fervour25. Books and studies by Leifer, Foo, Chan, 
Azhar, Bedlington, Lau, Turnbull, Frost and Balasingam all pointed the blame at 
UMNO in starting the Riots, especially the extremist faction known as the Ultras 
led by its Secretary-General, Syed Jaafar Albar. Azhar also highlighted the fact 
that the Ultras instigated Singapore Malays by fanning anti-PAP sentiments by 
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suggesting conspiracies such as “PAP planning to turn Singapore into a mini-
Israel and for a secret plan to destroy Malay unity”26. The Ultras led by Albar held 
considerable clout within the ranks of UMNO and they managed to get the party to 
rally around their cause. Nordin found that, “moderates within UMNO such as 
Tunku and Dato’ Dr Ismail, the Home Minister, were severely criticized and 
charged for being too soft on Lee Kuan Yew” 27 . Leifer pointed out that the 
emotionally-charged SUMNO Convention held in Pasir Panjang on 12th July 1964 
was a response by UMNO to PAP’s own Convention with the Singapore Malay 
leaders, which was to be held at a later date on 19th July 1964. Apart from UMNO 
and SUMNO, the Convention had also attracted many other racist groups such as 
the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and Peninsula Malay Union (PMU)28. Leifer 
added that the Convention led to the creation of the Singapore Malay Action 
Committee (SMAC) which lobbied to the PAP government to give more rights and 
priviliges to the Singapore Malay community. The Covention’s keynote speaker 
was none other than Albar, who whipped out emotive rhetorics with claims that the 
Malays in Singapore were better off during the Japanese Occupation than under 
PAP’s rule29. Lau noted that such emotive rhetoric only served to provoke the 
already charged up Singapore Malays. Even after the Riots broke out, “Albar did 
not tone down on his rhetoric and continued to stoke the communal tension by 
lashing out at the PAP leaders”30. 
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Chan highlighted the fact that Malays in Singapore occupy a low socio-economic 
standing as compared to the other races and UMNO leaders regularly used this as 
an example of their Singapore brethrens being exploited under the PAP rule. Chan 
also noted that before the PAP helmed Singapore, the Malay community was 
already backward as compared to the others and prior to the merger with 
Malaysia, they were initially an untroublesome minority group31. She added that it 
was only after merger that they became bolder and more vocal in voicing their 
demands from the PAP government32. Foo pointed out racist politicians such as 
Albar politicized socio-economic issues such as the Kallang resettlement project 
where Kallang residents had to be relocated for development purposes. UMNO 
exploited this by highlighting the plight of the Malay residents who have to be 
relocated, ignoring the fact that Malay families roughly made up only 10% of the 
total number of residents which needed to be relocated33. Foo also added that 
after the Riots, the PAP government pressed hard for a Commission of Inquiry to 
be formed, but the Malaysian leaders were reluctant to agree to the proposal, as a 
full blown investigation might uncover incriminating evidences against them. When 
Singapore got separated, the Commission was dissolved and their findings were 
never made public34. Foo pointed out that a year later, when there was a build up 
of political tension, Tunku decided that Singapore needed to be separated from 
Malaysia in order to avoid a repeat of the bloodshed in 196435.       
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2.2. Aggressive Communal-based Groups 
Chan pointed out that in 1961 the Singapore government managed to foil a plot by 
the Angkatan Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapura or the Revolutionary Islamic Army 
of Singapore (ARTIS) which was an undesirable group of ex-convicts bent on 
starting a racial conflict in Singapore36. Leifer also noted that on the day of the 
procession on 21st July 1964, “there were mysterious men numbering around thirty 
wearing all black outfits complete with warrior headdresses and that these men 
appeared to be the ones who provoked the violence”37. It was not conclusively 
proven that these mysterious men were the ones who caused the Riots, but their 
presence might have aggravated the tense situation on the ground. Hyde also 
reported of leaders of invulnerability cults with Indonesian links from the Peninsula 
coming down to Singapore during the Riots, “distributing holy water and scarves 
with purported talismanic properties to Malay rioters”38. Although there were no 
other documentary records of such cases, there were oral testimonies in the later 
Chapter in this thesis which corroborate with Hyde on the prevalent rumour of the 
coming of silat groups from peninsula Malaysia to Singapore to help their Malay 
brethrens.  
2.3. Konfrontasi Threat 
During its fledging days, Turnbull pointed out that the Federation of Malaysia faced 
hostile treatments from neighbouring countries such as Indonesia which regarded 
it as a “neo-colonialist plot”39. Chow and Balasingam added that Indonesia took a 
step further and launched a Konfrontasi campaign to create instability in Malaysia 
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by means of “an armed campaign against the territory to include Singapore”40. 
Hyde found that there was an active propaganda campaign to incite the Malays 
against the Chinese, as well as the otherway around, by beaming radio signals 
from obscured Riau-based radio stations to Singapore41.  Leifer reported that there 
were organized instigations to ferment interracial tension such as the distribution 
of seditious leaflets and flyers with the aim of starting a riot, spreading rumours of 
an imminent Chinese attack on the Malays and the urgent need for Malays to carry 
out the first strike first42. Hyde also revealed that Singapore’s Special Branch 
uncovered huge quantities of racist pamphlets from the Riau Islands being 
smuggled into Singapore’s shores43. Apart from the pamphlets, Hyde reported that 
the police also managed to uncover huge cache of arms, explosives and 
ammunition from illegal boat operators44.  
Hyde also found that Indonesia conducted their armed acts of saboteurs by 
sending their armed commandos straight into Singapore and Malaysian territories 
by means of cultivating fifth columnists by grooming them to be Indonesian agents. 
These Singaporean and Malaysian nationals received various forms of trainings in 
the handling of arms and explosives as well as political indoctrination in various 
bases in Indonesia45. Upon completion of their training, they would be sent back to 
their respective homelands to create instability and incite violence. Hyde 
highlighted the fact that it was not difficult for the Indonesians to identify potential 
fifth columnists as there were scores of Malays with extremist tendencies who 
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were willing to work as their proxies46. Bedlington noted that “venues such as the 
Indonesia’s Consulate and the premises of the Persatuan Bawean Singapura in 
Singapore were used as bases for their subversive activities”47. However, there 
were some who believed that the Indonesians were not the main instigator for the 
Riots. Lau found that George Bogaars, head of Singapore’s Special Branch, and 
Arthur H. Rosen, the American Consul, ruled out the Indonesians as the prime 
suspect for the outbreak of the July Riot. Although they contributed significantly in 
laying the foundation which contributed to the simmering racial tension, there was 
a lack of hard evidence to blame them for starting the Riots48.      
2.4. Elements from the Chinese Community 
Hanna found that members of the Chinese Secret Societies were amply paid by 
the Indonesians to carry out their watery smuggling activities in smuggling racist 
pamphlets49. As for the Chinese communist sympathizers, Hyde highlighted that 
the main reason as to why they would collaborate with the Indonesians is simply 
because both sides shared the same goal of wanting to see Singapore’s failure in 
its foray in the Federation50. However, even though some of them were covertly on 
the payrolls of the Indonesians in smuggling contraband items into Singapore, 
during the rioting period they were still seen as the defenders of the Chinese 
community. Leifer noted that the Chinese Secret Societies played prominent roles 
during the mayhem and their intervention in the subsequent stages of the Riots 
was one aggravating factor that led to the the escalation of the Riots 51 . Lau 
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pointed out that the Chinese community in Singapore felt aggrieved by the 
injustice they felt from the Malay extremists whom they felt had an upper hand in 
carrying out those violent acts against them and many felt that had it not been for 
the actions of these Secret Societies, many more Chinese lives would have been 
lost52.  
2.5. On the Legacy and Effects of the Riots 
Hanna pointed out that the different narratives were borne out of so much political 
tension between Singapore and Malaysia that the different versions are suspect 
and impossible to reconcile even up until now53.  Lau noted that when the State 
launched the official national historical narrative through its National Education 
project, the Riots fit in nicely with the overarching themes of the Singapore Story 
such as Singapore’s vulnerability to dangers such as communalism54 and it fed 
into PAP’s justification in reaffirming ethnic diversity in public culture and the 
encouragement of racial harmony amongst Singaporeans55.  
Lau noted that during the Riots, the Chinese community complained that Malay 
officers in the Police and Army discriminated against them in favour of the Malays 
during the clashes56. Bedlington found out that as a result of the Riots, there 
existed a heightened distrust of Malays in the various security apparatus which led 
to the need for the gradual change in the racial composition of the Police and 
Armed Forces57.  
                                               
52Lau. A moment of anguish. p. 180. 
53Hanna, Reports on Singapore and Malaya, p. 100. 
54Loh. Within the Singapore story. p.1. 
55Ibid. p. 12. 
56Lau. A moment of anguish. p. 180. 




Narayanan noted that it can also be said that the experience of ethno-religious 
violence such as the Riots shaped PAP’s approach in managing interracial 
relations in Singapore in the subsequent years after she gained her 
independence58. One takeaway from the Riots that they learnt was to identify 
racial chauvinists and to deal with ethnic tensions decisively during its early 
stages59. Narayanan added that PAP believed that ethno-religious violence such 
as the Riots broke out due to the racial chauvinists who were left unchecked and 
were able to spread their influence on the masses. Narayanan pointed out that in 
recent times, the State was quick to react to incidents such as the tudung issue 
and the arrest of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group by utilizing the Malay elites 
in reassuring the community as well as to rally behind the State60. Thus to prevent 
the outbreak of violence, aggressive chauvinism must be dealt with by a strong 
intervention on the part of the State.  
3. Assessment 
3.1. Conventional Assessment 
In analyzing the secondary literatures on the Riots, there are a few points that can 
be raised which corroborates with the dominant discourse on the Riots. The issue 
on the PAP-UMNO conflict highlighted the crucial role this conflict played in 
fermenting the restless atmosphere which made a full blown racial riot possible. 
The Ultras represented the segments within UMNO who loathed the PAP, 
believing that the PAP had transgressed the rights of the Malays by propagating 
the idea of multiracialism. They were very vocal in their demands and had to 
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accept some of the blame for the Riots as their emotive political rhetoric charged 
up their supporters. As pointed out by Chan, their rhetorics may sometimes consist 
of baseless accusations directed against the PAP, such as in the case of the 
Kallang resettlement project, but UMNO gained from such misleading arguments 
as it caused Singapore Malays to galvanize their support around the party whom 
they viewed as the one who dared to stand up and defend their rights. They 
organized the emotionally-charged Pasir Panjang Convention in order to pre-empt 
PAP’s meeting with the Malay leaders in Victoria Theatre. The Ultras were 
systematic in instigating and goading the Malay masses in Singapore into 
subscribing to their Malay supremacist agenda.   
The communal fervour resulting from the simmering political tension between PAP 
and UMNO eventually unravelled the violent chain of events in 1964. The lesson 
learnt from the Riots is that there is always the possibility of an outbreak of 
violence and bloodshed resulting from the political bickerings and rhetorics 
between political leaders which incited communal sentiments. The political 
bickerings between PAP and UMNO continued even after 1964. PAP continued to 
aggressively pursue its multiracial stance and set up the Malayan Solidarity 
Convention (MSC), a pan-Malaysian multiracial coalition of like minded opposition 
parties, to challenge the UMNO-led Alliance coalition61. Instead of being muzzled, 
the Ultras in UMNO became more aggressive in attacking the PAP. It was this 
probability of future violence that led to the separation of Singapore with Malaysia. 
The Riots remained a grisly reminder of what could have happen if political 
tensions were not smoothened out. 
                                               




In retrospect, Singapore’s destiny in Malaysia seemed almost doomed from the 
start, due to the opposing political ideologies between PAP and UMNO. PAP 
adhered to a socialist ideology whose political aspirations were not confined to the 
boundaries of Singapore and embraced multiracialism as the bedrock of its 
political ideology. This put them on a collision course with their UMNO-led Alliance 
counterparts who were strictly communal and conservative 62 . SUMNO’s 
humiliating defeat in the 1963 Singapore General Elections and PAP’s token 
participation in the 1964 Federal General Election seemed too much for UMNO 
who might have perceived PAP as having crossed the line and suspecting them of 
harbouring long term ambition to supplant the MCA in the Federal government. 
Political tension and irresponsible politicians who spouted hate-based rhetoric 
created an environment that was susceptible to racial violence.   
However it must be pointed out that although the political conflict between PAP 
and UMNO played a major role in escalating the racial tension that led to the 
outbreak of the Riots, it is reductivist to simply direct the blame solely at either 
UMNO or PAP. There were other elements lurking in the background that took the 
opportunity to instigate interracial clashes, adding fuel to the fire, and thus further 
destabilizing the situation. The far-Right faction seemed to be the one charting out 
UMNO’s direction. It was not surprising that the racist faction was the one dictating 
the party’s course as there were many other groups during the period which 
harboured racist ideas and were strongly anti-Chinese as well.  There were also 
other more extreme groups such as PMIP and PMU as well as other clandestine 
martial arts groups dabbling in mysticism. The coalescene of these different far-
Right Malay groups in tiny Singapore brought about an explosion of racist fervour 
                                               




amongst the Malays in Singapore. The clandestine mystical groups aggravated 
the situation further as their supposed existence and involvement boosted the 
Singapore Malay community’s beliefs that they had the supernatural elements 
siding with them in their conflict against the Chinese. This new-found confidence 
may have made them more aggressive in violent clashes against the Chinese.     
3.2. Alternative Accounts 
The alternative accounts on the Riots shed some interesting light on the incident. 
They explored themes pertaining to the Riots which are often absent from the 
dominant discourse. The roles of the Chinese Secret Societies, the communists 
and the Indonesians added new dimensions in analyzing the Riots. It showed that 
while the PAP-UMNO political conflict was one of the causes for the outbreak of 
the Riots, it was not the sole contributing cause to the Riots. There were also other 
causes which led to the escalation of interracial tension on the ground. These 
alternative accounts are often absent from the dominant discourse on the Riots. 
While the politicians and Malay chauvinists were the key instigators of starting the 
Riots, the Chinese Secret Societies cannot be discounted from the overall 
destruction caused by the Riots. They might not have started the Riots but their 
violent reaction to the first blows by the Malay aggressors helped sustained the 
violence. Their retaliatory actions stoked the violence further.  
The Indonesians under the aegis of the Konfrontasi campaign was another factor 
to be blamed for the Riots. However, their roles were often either downplayed or 
omitted from the dominant discourse on the Riots. Yet studies such as those by 
Leifer and Hyde revealed to us the depth of their involvement in the Riots. They 




to pursue their goal of destabilizing Singapore. Even though they had more overt 
campaigns such as beaming seditious radio stations on Singapore’s radio waves, 
nonetheless it was their covert campaigns such as the distribution of flyers and the 
cultivation of moles which caused the greatest damage. There was concrete 
evidence that the Indonesians played a major role in laying the seeds of discord 
amongst the Chinese and Malays in Singapore, months before the Riots occurred. 
The Indonesians managed to get not just Malay extremists to assist them in their 
Konfrontasi plot, but also members of the Chinese Secret Societies and Chinese 
communist sympathizers as well. Even though the Konfrontasi campaign carried 
very strong anti-Malaysia and anti-Chinese overtones, they managed to lure the 
Chinese Secret Societies by paying them for smuggling seditious items and 
courted the Chinese communist sympathizers by promising them a shared goal in 
wanting to see the failure of Singapore’s foray into the Federation. These points 
highlighted how organized the Indonesians were in cultivating interracial tension in 
Singapore. 
An analysis of the works written on the Riots informs us that we should adopt a 
multi-dimensional approach in studying it. There were different players involved 
with varying degrees of complicity, but each individual’s actions contributed to the 
outbreak of violence. In critically re-examining certain themes which appear in the 
dominant discourse on the Riots, we must not neglect the underexplored themes 
which can add new dimensions to how the Riots are being perceived. A synthesis 
of all the themes uncovered in the secondary accounts on the Riots can provide us 
with a better understanding of the Riots. An analysis of the secondary works done 
on the Riots revealed to us the complexity of the political situation in Singapore 




3.3. Revisiting the Riots 
Scholars who had revisited the Riots decades after it had happened will analyze 
the positionality of the Riots in relation to the other issues throughout Singapore’s 
history. Over time, they are privy to a lot more information on the Riots and are 
able to contextualize the Riots vis-à-vis the socio-political developments in 
Singapore. The Riots carry with it painful memories that led to bitter legacies 
during post-independence Singapore. It was a particularly controversial historical 
event which involved political parties from different spectrums and the Riots has 
been remembered differently by different groups. Bedlington found out that one 
resulting effect of the Riots was to have the loyalty of the Singapore Malay 
community to the State brought into question, as they became perceived to be 
more loyal to their racial brethren rather than their fellow Singaporeans.    
The PAP realized that in a multiethnic Singapore, it had to be quick in identifying 
as well as crushing potential fire starters. The Riots represents a dark chapter in 
Singapore’s history which has been regularly revisited to drive the message that 
political instability can easily lead to racial tensions which in the end may escalate 
to full-blown violence. 
Loh studied how the Riots fit into the larger picture of the official State historical 
narrative. The Riots represents the bleak period in Singapore’s post World War 
Two history. Chaos and anarchy reigned when irresponsible politicians took to the 
stage and as part of the national narrative, incidents such as the Riots were 
emphasized to highlight the traumatic early years of Singapore. The State, in the 
form of PAP, is then portrayed as the only rational player that is able to steer the 




continued to this day. Narayanan on the other hand argued that the Riots acted as 
a historical precedent which the PAP government used in managing future racial-
based incidents. It served as a convenient tool for the State to conjure up past 
wounds in emphasizing the dangers of a permanent ethnic fault lines that existed 
in our society. By emphasizing the dangers, they are able to demarcate the out-of-
bound markers on ethnic issues, thus enabling them to punish anyone they deem 
as “racial chauvinists”. Revisiting the Riots in the contemporary period allowed Loh 
and Ganesan to analyze how the dominant discourse on the Riots is being used 
by the State in appropriating certain themes from the Riots to suit their specific 
agendas. Bedlington on the otherhand highlighted the effects of the Riots on the 
Singapore Malay community. The works of Loh, Ganesan and Bedlington showed 
the consequences of having the State pursuing the dominant discourse on the 
Riots. It led to a state which is paranoid of its Malay minorities and treats their 
racial issues as a highly sensitive matter in which the State is the only authoritative 
voice allowed to discuss the issue. Lily Zubaidah Rahim had argued that PAP 
government’s bitter experiences with Malaysia and Indonesia during Singapore’s 
early years of independence breeds a sense of Malay phobia which can be seen 
through its attitude towards the Malay Muslim community in Singapore. The Malay 
phobia is manifested in a siege mentality which made them highly suspicious of 
the loyalties pledged by the Malay Muslim community in Singapore. They had long 
viewed The Malays as a potential fifth column in any events of outright hostility 
between Singapore and her immediate neighbours63.   
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In this chapter, we have shown how the various secondary sources contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding on the Riots. Their different approaches in 
analyzing the Riots allowed us to revisit the Riots under different contexts. The 
secondary sources range from blow-by-blow accounts of the Riots, focusing on a 
thematic analysis on the Riots, as well as sources looking at the Riots from the 
larger context of nation-building in Singapore. These accounts challenge the 
State’s authoritative account by presenting alternate accounts to the Riots. The 
dominant account points to UMNO and the Ultras for causing the Riots; however 
accounts from this chapter presented other groups who were guilty of either 
playing a part in the lead up to the outbreak of the Riots, or contributing to the 
acceleration of violence after the first sparks at Kampong Soopoo. Revisionist 
historians explicate on the link between the State’s selective interpretations of the 
Riots with that of the nation building process in Singapore.  
While the different secondary sources on the 1964 Racial Riots were thorough in 
researching on the Riots, there is still no in-depth study on the accounts on the 
Riots provided by the different members of the PAP Old Guards. The dominant 
discourse on the Riots often mirrors closely the accounts of Mr Lee Kuan Yew. 
The following Chapter however will look at the accounts of the Riots from the 
viewpoint of his former lieutanents in the PAP and assess if it is either in line or 




CHAPTER 3: THE AUTHORITATIVE NARRATIVE? 
ACCOUNTS FROM THE PAP OLD GUARDS 
1. Introduction 
The Singapore State’s dominant account of the 1964 Racial Riots is based mostly 
on the accounts of the PAP Old Guards who led the Party during the period of 
1950s to 1960s. From the time of Singapore’s independence until now, PAP has 
enjoyed nearly five decades of uninterrupted rule. This has allowed them to 
dominate various spheres of Singaporean’s life which includes the construction of 
national historical narrative. In 1997 the State launched the “Singapore Story” 
project which aims to present the “official account” of Singapore’s history. However 
as historian Loh Kah Seng pointed out, 
“The most compelling chapter of the “Singapore Story” that deals with the 1950s 
and 1960s has been authorized primarily by the personal experiences of the PAP 
Old Guard, whose privileged positions as leaders of government during that period 
have allowed them to pre-empt alternative interpretations of contemporary 
events.”64 
However it is important to note that even this official narrative from the Old Guards 
has its differences in nuances and interpretations. Therefore this chapter will be 
looking at the different accounts given by the various PAP Old Guards. It will look 
at the accounts of Singapore’s founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the Malay 
PAP Old Guards and other PAP Old Guards. It will highlight the dominant themes 
recounted by these Old Guards which corroborated with the dominant discourse 
                                               




on the 1964 Racial Riots. This chapter will also be presenting accounts from the 
other PAP Old Guards which were either conspicuously absent in mentioning the 
Riots or whose accounts on the Riots are incongruent with the dominant 
discourse.  
2. Lee Kuan Yew’s Accounts 
Lee Kuan Yew was one of the main political actors during the tumultuous period in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Being the leader of PAP and the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, he was the Ultras’ number one enemy as his multiracial approach to 
politics was at odds with UMNO’s political approach and the Alliance’s communal 
based politics65. However it must be pointed out that PAP is an ambitious party 
harbouring the ultimate end goal of forming the government. The party knew that 
given the socio-political context in Malaysia, the support of the Malay masses is 
critical in attaining that goal. Whilst professing a “multi-racial” approach, in reality 
the PAP was flexible in their political strategy in the Federation elections by 
astutely downplaying their rivalry with UMNO and positioning themselves as a 
more viable alternative to the Chinese-based MCA66. Being the dominant leader of 
the PAP, it is important to analyze Lee Kuan Yew’s views and perceptions on the 
Riots as it influenced the dominant discourse on the 1964 Racial Riots. Lee’s 
personal accounts on the Riots can be found in his official memoir published in 
1998, his official biography written by Alex Josey, his speeches and his comments 
in the newspapers. 
 
                                               
65Josey. Lee Kuan Yew. p. 85. 
66




2.1. Blaming the Ultras 
During the 1963 General Election in Singapore, PAP had defeated SUMNO which 
made UMNO bitter about it. PAP had secured 73% of the parliamentary seats 
while the Singapore Alliance won zero seats67. According to Lee;  
“We did not know until after the Malaysian election in April 1964 how ominously 
UMNO viewed this unexpected PAP victory and how vicious their counter-attacks 
would be.”68 
A few weeks before the Riots, Lee Kuan Yew met with three hundred Muslim 
leaders in Singapore at the Victoria Theatre which lasted for five hours. According 
to Lee, he held the meeting in order to have a frank discussion with these Malay 
leaders after he was faced with constant streams of accusations by UMNO leaders 
and the Utusan Melayu which he perceived as being unfounded and ridiculous69. 
Amongst this was the Kallang resettlement project which the Ultras accused the 
PAP of targeting the Malay residents in Kallang, nevermind that Malays made up 
of only ten percent of those asked to move70. In the meeting, Lee identified three 
main problems plaguing the Singapore Malay community, namely education, 
employment and housing as well as categorically spelling out the PAP 
government’s policies in tackling these issues. He also warned against the 
dangers of communal friction between the Malays and Chinese which could easily 
be exploited by Indonesia as part of their Konfrontasi plot and he also took UMNO 
to task for joining this propaganda campaign by subtly instigating the Singapore 
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Malays for supposedly being discriminated by the PAP government71. Lee pledged 
that the PAP government would give its help and assistance to Singapore Malays 
in gaining employment. However he ruled out any forms of affirmative action in 
giving the Malays special economic privileges for the community, as he felt that 
these economic expectations and grievances were fanned by UMNO politicians 
and it was no longer possible to contain the overworked feelings of the 
community72. Lee expressed his displeasure with the twenty-three men Singapore 
Malay Action Committee (SMAC) formed by UMNO recently which he accused of 
being filled with racists and Indonesian agents, although he did not rule out 
meeting them for discussions. Among the members was Isa Zain who was named 
by the Central Government as an Indonesian agent73.  
In his official memoir which was released in 1998, the narratives on the Riots were 
placed under the Chapter titled, “Albar Stokes Up Malay Passions” leaving readers 
no doubt as to who he felt was responsible for the Riots. He viewed it as a 
sustained campaign on the part of Syed Jaafar Albar, the UMNO Ultras and 
Utusan Melayu in causing the Riots. According to Lee, “They now mounted a 
campaign to work up a sense of grievance among Malays over specific issues, 
real or imaginary, playing on the fact that theirs was the least successful and 
poorest of the different communities in Singapore.” 74  Lee remarked that the 
secretary-general of SUMNO, Syed Esa Almanoer, played it up by giving an 
emotional speech calling for a holy war against those who oppressed the Malay 
communities in Singapore. Esa was quoted saying, “... patience and 
understanding cannot stand the limit when people have come out from within or 
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without to disturb our castle, our place to live, and our religion. When it comes to 
such a climax it is the duty of all Muslims to sacrifice their lives and property.”75 
What was significant in Lee’s accounts of the Riots in his memoir was highlighting 
the Riots as being the darkest hour facing Singaporeans during the country’s post-
World War Two history. He noted that, “racial passions had been aroused and 
mayhem had broken loose”76. Lee highlighted that during the aftermath of the 
Riots, the Singapore Government pressed for a full inquiry into the matter but the 
Royal Commission was set up rather half heartedly by the Federal Government 
and its findings have not been released even up until now.77 Lee also noted that 
the Riots had an impact on the political front and Lee highlighted how Tun Abdul 
Razak attempted to negotiate for some concessionary bargaining with Dr Goh 
Keng Swee in order to sideline Lee from Malaysia’s and Singapore’s politics78.  
2.2. Lee’s Reaction in the Immediate Aftermath 
Within hours after the Riots broke out, Lee went on air to address the Singaporean 
masses. He continued to give a series of radio broadcasts in the subsequent days 
aimed at allaying the fear of the masses. In his radio broadcast a few hours after 
the Riots, Lee warned people to stay at home and not to break the curfews. He 
explained that the Riots were caused by stragglers from the procession that had 
beaten up a member of the Federal Reserve Unit who had asked them to get back 
in line79. In the broadcasts, he did note that there had been organization and 
planning behind the violence even though he neither mentioned any specific 
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names nor groups80. About a week after the outbreak of the Riots at a dinner 
organized by the Kallang Goodwill Committee, Lee was more specific in pointing 
out the blame for the Riots by naming the Indonesian aggressors, the Ultras and 
the Chinese chauvinists and communists as the ones who fermented such a tense 
atmosphere which threatened the ethnic relationship between the Malays and 
Chinese81. During a visit to the predominantly Malay Southern Islands, he warned 
residents against external forces that were spreading rumours to incite fear. He 
said that there were 60 former West Irian volunteers and about 30 Artis members 
in the State and blamed them for September’s violence82. As for the September 
riot, Lee believed that Sukarno was the main culprit behind it, noting that the 
murder of a trishaw rider, which was the catalyst to the September Riots, 
coincided with an airdrop of Indonesian paratroopers83. 
3. Accounts by PAP Malay Leaders 
The accounts of the Malay PAP Old Guards are important, as they encountered 
countless challenges and personal dilemmas during the period. UMNO’s key 
agenda was the championing of Malay rights and accused the PAP of being 
discriminatory against Singapore Malays. The Malay leaders in PAP were 
therefore seen as anomalies and it would be useful for this thesis in uncovering 
their views on the 1964 Racial Riots. This chapter examines the accounts of PAP 
MPs Othman Wok and Ya’acob Mohamed as well as Bulat Hamid who was the 
PAP branch secretary for PAP’s Pasir Panjang branch. There are very few works 
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done on PAP Malay leaders of the fifties and sixties. Only Othman Wok is featured 
prominently in the dominant narrative on Singapore’s history. In 2005, he gave a 
special interview to the National Archives Singapore specifically on the 1964 
Racial Riots itself. In that same series, Bulat Hamid who was a PAP Grassroots 
leader also gave his accounts on the Riots. Ya’acob Mohamed was a key leader of 
Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) and Singapore UMNO before joining the PAP. He 
even earned the nickname, “torpedo UMNO” for being a firebrand orator. Upon his 
death, his family passed a whole collection of documents, letters and audio tapes 
which he had amassed over his lifetime to a close family friend, Sulaiman Jeem, 
for the latter to write a book on Ya’acob84. His biography gave insights into his 
views on the Riots and the political issues surrounding it.  
Ya’acob and Bulat gave rosy accounts of the ethnic relationships between Malays 
and Chinese in Singapore. Prior to 1960s, Ya’acob mentioned that he won by a 
landslide when he was competing in the heavily Chinese-populated Bukit Timah 
ward in the 1963 elections85. Bulat remembered that he mixed freely with his 
Chinese peers when he was growing up and felt that racial tensions were more 
pronounced only after the political scene in Singapore took a communal stance 
with the coming of communal-based parties such as UMNO and Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA)86.    
Othman, Bulat and Ya’acob unanimously agreed that UMNO and their Ultra 
leaders were largely responsible for the Riots. Othman and Bulat were 
unequivocal in their assessment that it was an organized and sustained campaign 
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by UMNO to breed hatred amongst the Malays against the Chinese. Othman 
noted that during the months preceding the Riots, Utusan Melayu ran countless 
fabricated articles purporting that PAP harboured highly discriminatory views 
against Singapore Malays. He said that such untruths would have some degree of 
influence on Singapore Malays. Albar allayed the fears of Singapore Malays and 
advised them not to be afraid even if there were a thousand Lee Kuan Yews 
around87. Bulat identified key Singapore UMNO leaders like Ninggal bin Maksom 
and Borhan Muslim as spearheading Singapore UMNO’s campaign against PAP 
due to their bitterness in having lost many Malay-dominated constituencies in the 
Singapore’s 1963 election. During one of the election rallies Ninggal was even 
quoted as saying that Malays who voted for PAP were traitors and were not 
allowed to be buried in a Muslim cemetery when they died88. Othman and Bulat 
gave an overall assessment of the UMNO Ultras as having total disregard for 
peace and stability as well as being politically licentious. It was mostly due to their 
racist recklessness that fermented the simmering tension amongst the Malays 
against the Chinese which culminated in the Riots.  
Ya’acob on the other hand gave a slightly differing account on the Riots. He felt 
that the fact that UMNO propagated Malay issues alone did not mean that they 
were racist, especially since they agreed to be part of the Alliance coalition with 
other communal-based parties in Malaysia. He also added that he admired Albar 
as a man of principles, although he agreed that he was partly to be blamed for the 
Riots due to his recklessness during political rallies89. 
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According to Othman, Lee Kuan Yew had a meeting with the PAP Malay MPs on 
the day before the Riots to seek their advice on whether to proceed with the 
Procession as he had received intelligence information that there might be trouble 
brewing. There were also reports suggesting that there was a much higher number 
of people coming into Singapore from across the Causeway in the days leading up 
to 21st July90. Ya’acob in his account felt that they should not proceed due to 
safety fears as he had forseen dangers ahead91. However according to Othman, 
he suggested to Lee they should proceed as planned as he felt that they would be 
labelled as anti-Islam and playing into the hands of UMNO if they were to cancel 
the procession92. All three were part of the contingent representing PAP during 
that fateful day. According to Bulat while the contingents assembled at the 
Padang, Othman received a tip-off warning him of the impending danger ahead. 
He then called all the PAP Malay MPs and Bulat for a short meeting to warn them 
of possible impending danger and advised them to exercise a high degree of 
vigilance93.  
Othman felt that by the time the contingents assembled at the Padang, the 
atmosphere was already very tense. There were 25,000 people who attended the 
procession and when the Yang-Di Pertuan Negara Yusof Ishak gave his speech, 
he was jeered and heckled by segments of the contingents94. There were many 
onlookers who stood at the side watching the procession and there were also a 
few Chinese men who sold chendols and drinks in milk tins by the sidewalk. When 
the procession reached Kampong Soopoo near Kallang, Bulat saw a few men 
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kicking these tins and started to rain punches and kicks on these Chinese drink 
vendors. The men were wearing arm bands with symbols of a “handshake” and a 
“black bull” indicating they were either from UMNO or Partai Rakyat95. However 
Ya’acob believed that the Riots was not started by Singapore Malays and pointed 
out to gangster elements within the procession96. According to Othman, there were 
some stragglers from the contingent who were asked to get back in line by the 
police, but they ended up beating these Chinese policemen instead. Sensing that 
something bad was going to happen, Othman then ordered the PAP contingent to 
seek refuge in the compound of the Old Airport at Kallang and they stayed there 
until evening. When the curfew was lifted on the second day, there was 
widespread violence in Geylang Serai with the Chinese Secret Societies exacting 
their revenge, leading to Singapore being placed under another round of curfew97. 
Othman and Bulat also highlighted strong evidences that pointed out to meticulous 
planning behind the violence. A week after the Riots, Othman met an old contact 
from Utusan Melayu in Kuala Lumpur who accidentally blurted out to him that the 
Utusan reporters knew about the Riots at 2pm even though the first clashes only 
occurred at 4pm. Othman questioned on how the Utusan reporters managed to 
get a scoop on the outbreak of the Riots hours before it actually occured98. Bulat 
also pointed out the fact that since the clashes at Kallang and Geylang Serai 
started simultaneously at 4pm, they might be a pre-planned co-ordinated attack99.       
From the Riots, Othman and Bulat raised the issue of Singapore’s security 
concerns during the emergency period. Othman managed to call Toh Chin Chye 
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and advised him to order a curfew immediately but as the Federal Ministry of 
Home Affairs in Kuala Lumpur was the only one that could call for a curfew, four 
hours was to elapse before the curfew was finally declared in Singapore. Othman 
noted that within the four hours, many lives were already lost100. Bulat was also 
both worried and sceptical of the Malaysian Riots Squad’s ability to maintain 
peace and order in Singapore under such circumstances. He said that the Riot 
Squad did not protect the PAP contingent and purposely left their posts in the 
compound of the Old Airport leaving the PAP members defenceless. In the Sultan 
Mosque, Bulat also mentioned that members of the Federal Riot Squad actually 
gave the Malay rioters their batons to beat up the Chinese101.  
Ya’acob and Othman gave different accounts of the condition on the ground during 
the aftermath of the Riots. Ya’acob recalled that during his rounds together with 
Minister Ong Pang Boon in the affected areas, they were warmly received by the 
villagers and Ong was shocked by this positive response from the ground102. In 
comparison, Othman on the other hand noted that the mood was very tense even 
after 21st July and pointed out that Rahmat Kenap, a PAP Malay MP, was heckled 
by the Geylang Serai residents who called him “babi”. Othman was himself 
labelled as “kaffir” and “anti-Melayu” by Albar and Utusan Melayu103. The Umno 
Ultras back in Kuala Lumpur naturally placed the blame on the Riots squarely on 
the Chinese. The Singapore government pressed for a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry to be set up but its results were never published. Othman said that the 
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Commission was rather half-hearted in doing its task and he himself never had the 
opportunity to tell his full side of the story on the Riots104.  
Othman and Bulat also highlighted the didactic outcome that could be gleaned 
from the Riots. Both used the example of the Riots as proof that we should not 
take racial relationships here for granted and that these are important lessons to 
be learnt for the future generations of Singaporeans. Othman even highlighted the 
example of Tang Liang Hong in the 1997 General Election as a dangerous 
element within the society guilty of inciting racial tensions which can easily spiral 
into a massive riot105.    
4. Accounts from the PAP Old Guards 
Amongst Lee’s closest lieutenants and close confidantes during the period were 
PAP Old Guards like Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin Chye and S Rajaratnam. 
There were also other Old Guards such as Lee Khoon Choy and Lim Kim San who 
together with Lee overcame the various challenges facing PAP during the period. 
Their accounts and perceptions of the 1964 Racial Riots will be analyzed in this 
part of the Chapter. 
Dr Goh Keng Swee believed that the main underlying reason as to why UMNO 
adopted such an extreme communal approach was due to the intense political 
rivalry between PAP and UMNO. UMNO’s communal-based politics was 
threatened by PAP’s multiracial stance and the last straw came when PAP started 
the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) which according to Dr Goh, 






“immediately set off alarm bells in Kuala Lumpur.”106 Dr Goh felt that the Utusan 
Melayu and UMNO Ultras, chiefly Albar, were to be blamed for the Riots. 
Singapore UMNO was very vocal and aggressive in trying to court the votes of the 
Malay voters using the issue of Malay special rights as its tool and he viewed it as 
a sustained campaign on the part of UMNO.107 
What Dr Toh Chin Chye remembered most from the Riots was the fact that the 
Singapore Government was caught unprepared on 21st July 1964.108 He lamented 
the fact that Lee Kuan Yew made too many concessions to the Federal 
Government when they signed the merger agreement in 1963 and one of the 
concessions made was in the domain of internal security. Singapore had 
relinquished her control over internal security and the Special Branch submitted its 
daily intelligence reports directly to Kuala Lumpur bypassing the Singapore 
Government 109 . When the riot happened, Dennis Bloodsworth, a journalist, 
showed him a copy of a leaflet he picked up along Boat Quay which called for 
Malays to gather in Padang to massacre the Chinese. Dr Toh was shocked when 
he saw this, as it showed the Singapore government was kept out of the loop from 
the Police or the Special Branch on such internal threats110. Echoing the same 
sentiment that there was sufficient planning behind the Riots was PAP Minister 
Lee Khoon Choy, as it came to his attention that leaflets from the Singapore Malay 
Action Committee (SMAC) had been distributed amongst the Malays in Singapore 
and Johor, urging them to kill the Chinese111. Minister Lee blamed the UMNO 
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Ultras and Albar as the main culprit for stoking the fire amongst Singapore Malays 
and inciting them against the Chinese.  
Dr Toh also made the effort to quell rumour-mongering, highlighting the potent 
threat that could be inflicted through such covert whisper campaigns. Dr Toh Chin 
Chye described a report accusing the Singapore Work Brigade of being 
responsible for the Riots as “rubbish” and warned against believing wholesale 
rumours spread by groups of people who wanted Singapore to be in a state of 
unsteady flux112. The security scares during the period was also attributed to 
Indonesia’s Konfrontasi campaign. Dr Toh blamed the September riot on the 
Indonesians, saying that the murders were the result of Indonesian saboteurs who 
arrived via two methods, namely sea landing at Pontian or parachuting into 
Labis113. Another PAP Minister Lim Kim San said that the majority of the people in 
Singapore were not in conflict with one another and that the fresh acts of violence 
were mainly due to Indonesia’s aggression114.  
5. Assessment  
5.1. Shift in Stance over the Years 
In analyzing Lee Kuan Yew’s interpretations of the Riots, there is a shift in his 
stance over the years. In 1964 within a few days after the Riots had occurred, Lee 
refrained from singling out any particular group for the violence but a few weeks 
after that, he blamed racial extremists from both sides of the ethnic line as well as 
the Indonesians for instigating the Riots. In the immediate days after the Riots, Lee 
pointed the blame at a number of different parties such as the Indonesians, the 
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Chinese chauvinists and communists as well as the Ultras, albeit indirectly. He 
pointed out that the disparate parties may share totally different visions and goals 
but what united them was a common interest in wanting to see the failure of the 
Malaysia project and the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation. Lee was 
especially worried about the Indonesians in particular with their expansionist 
philosophy which appealed to some groups of extremist Malays. As mentioned 
earlier, he appealed to the residents in the Malay dominated Southern Island not 
to fall prey to what he labelled as an organized rumour-mongering campaign by 
these professional saboteurs. Lee warned that as part of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi 
campaign, they would definitely make use of the disturbances and chaos of the 
1964 Racial Riots and attempt to escalate the violence.  
However in recent decades, Lee placed the blame almost exclusively on UMNO, 
especially its Secretary-General Syed Jaafar Albar. He emphasized this in his 
official memoir which was published in 1998. Lee’s account in his memoir was 
quite similar to another authorized biography written about Lee by Alex Josey, 
nearly two decades earlier. In both sets of authorized biographies, Lee blamed 
Syed Jaafar Albar, the UMNO Ultras and Utusan Melayu as kindling the racial 
tension. Lee repeatedly pointed out that the Utusan Melayu which was controlled 
by UMNO became the latter’s mouthpiece in propagating communal sentiments 
amongst the Singapore Malay masses by publishing highly misleading emotive 
headlines which were designed to fuel the Malay community in Singapore.    
A shift in the blame over the years may be attributed to the fact that Lee had to be 
cautious and sensitive when placing the blame against UMNO when Singapore 




relationship between the PAP and UMNO by blaming UMNO even if he felt 
strongly about it then. Immediately after the Riots, the main priority was to unite 
the people and it would be easier to blame the violence on Sukarno’s Konfrontasi 
plot and rally the people against a common external enemy. It was only after 
Singapore was separated from Malaysia that Lee was able to pin the blame on the 
UMNO Ultras, Utusan Melayu and Albar for causing the Riots. In giving his frank 
assessment, he blamed it entirely on the three guilty parties mentioned. Apart from 
Lee, the other PAP Old Guards such as Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin Chye, 
Othman Wok, Bulat Hamid and Lee Khoon Choy also blamed UMNO and the 
Ultras for instigating the Riots. PAP leaders of that generation did not view UMNO 
and their leaders in a positive light which is understandable given that they were 
locked in a heated political rivalry that could at times get very personal.  
However there is an exception in the case of Ya’acob Mohamed, a PAP Old Guard 
and an ex-UMNO member, who argued that it was reductivist to simply categorize 
UMNO as being racist and should be directly blamed for the Riots. Being an ex-
UMNO member he perhaps saw the need to differentiate between UMNO 
moderates and UMNO Ultras. UMNO moderates might have adopted a communal 
approach to Malaysian position but it did not mean that they were racist.  
However it is still perplexing to note that Indonesia and Sukarno’s Konfrontasi plot 
was conspicuously absent in Lee’s reinterpretation of the Riots in his two 
authorized biographies published after the separation. Lee did make specific 
reference to Sukarno and some of the Indonesian groups, yet the role of the 
Indonesians was largely downplayed and they were largely blamed instead for the 




Singapore had a cordial relationship with Indonesia and Lee Kuan Yew himself 
was quite close with Indonesia’s long term President Suharto. It was probably due 
to this close relationship that Lee had with Suharto that led him to downplay the 
role of the Indonesians in the two riots.   
5.2. Didactic Values Learnt from the 1964 Racial Riots 
In 1997 the State launched the National Education (N.E) project which is a large 
scale project aimed at educating younger generations of Singaporeans on 
Singapore history. Lee’s first memoir was launched the year after that. The N. E. 
Project stresses on themes such as ‘external dangers’ and ‘domestic fault lines’115. 
Students are always told not to take the country’s current stability for granted and 
examples of past historical events such as the 1964 Riots are used to highlight 
how vulnerable Singaporeans are. Thus it is not surprising that the interpretation of 
the Riots by some of the PAP leaders stress on themes which are common with 
the N. E. Project. There are very strong didactic values imbued within some of 
their personal narratives. Lee, Othman and Bulat portrayed a country under siege 
and a society vulnerable to total disintegration.  
Lee, Othman, Bulat, Dr Toh and Lee Khoon Choy also raised the alarm regarding 
the security concerns faced by Singapore during the Riots. Even though they were 
facing a large scale riot and an increasingly escalating violence, the Singapore 
government was powerless and unable to even declare a curfew in Singapore. 
Another cause of concern was Malaysia’s total control of the security apparatus 
which exposed the Singapore government’s vulnerability. They needed to call 
down the Federal Army and police to beef up the security in Singapore. On top of 
                                               




that, all the intelligence agencies reported directly to the Federal Government, by-
passing the Singapore Government thus keeping them out of the loop concerning 
the security in their own State. Bulat also raised doubt on the ability of the Federal 
Riot Police to be non-partisan when carrying out their duties, as he saw with his 
own eyes how they assisted the Malays during the Riots against the Chinese. The 
accounts given by Ya’acob Mohamad who viewed the Riots as an isolated one-off 
incident that was caused by outside elements was a minority view in comparison 
with his other counterparts in the PAP, which was most likely due to his past 
involvement with UMNO.  
5.3. Absence in the Memories of the PAP Old Guards 
There were very few of the PAP Old Guards who actually gave detailed accounts 
of the Riots. Only Lee Kuan Yew, Othman Wok, Ya’acob Mohamed and Bulat 
Hamid gave detailed insight into the violence. Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin 
Chye and Lee Khoon Choy provided one or two pages of the Riots in their 
biographies. Other prominent Old Guards such as S. Rajaratnam and Lim Kim 
San noticeably left out the Riots altogether from their biographies.  
It seems odd that the Riots, which is widely regarded as a seismic event in 
Singapore’s history could be omitted from their biographies. When Tun Abdul 
Razak toured Singapore in the days after the Riots, Dr Goh was the one who 
ushered him everywhere around the affected areas. Yet Dr Goh’s memoir only 
describes the general narrative account of the Riots in a few pages in his 
biography, and similarly for Dr Toh, who was the one who informed the Federal 
Government to call for a curfew after Othman had phoned him about the violence. 




detailed interview on his role in Singapore’s history, he devoted just a short 
paragraph on the Riots. Although the Riots was a historical fact, it just did not 
feature prominently in the minds of these PAP Old Guards, as they may view it 
bordering on the periphery of Singapore’s history. The Riots is probably an 
isolated incident of violence which the other PAP Old Guards felt was not 
important enough to be remembered and consistently portrayed as an important 
lesson in Singapore’s history. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that different PAP Old Guards remembered 
the 1964 Racial Riots differently. An analysis of the different groups within the PAP 
Old Guards elucidated different accounts of the Riots. Lee Kuan Yew gave the 
most vivid accounts on the Riots but even then, his views on the Riots had 
changed over the years. In recent times, he was more pronounced in categorically 
blaming UMNO and the Ultras as principal cause to the violence. The next group 
which provided a comprehensive account on the Riots were the Malay PAP Old 
Guards who were the frequent target of abuse by UMNO and the Ultras as being 
traitors to the Malay community. They remembered the Riots clearly as it put their 
loyalty to the PAP and their ties with the Malay community to a test during that 
chaotic period. Interestingly, for the other PAP Old Guards, the Riot was placed in 
their consciousness of historical periphery as it did not feature prominently in their 
recollection of Singapore’s history. For Lee, his accounts would be the 
authoritative accounts on the 1964 Racial Riots. It focused on blaming UMNO and 




the violence. There is also heavy emphasis on the preservation of racial harmony 
and the need to be wary of deep-seated ethnic fault lines in our society.  
These various accounts, though valuable and comprehensive, lack the inputs from 
the people on the grounds who were involved in the Riots. An understanding of the 
Riots from below is severely lacking as the secondary sources based their findings 
mostly on the accounts of people in position of status and authority. This chapter is 
similar to the previous Chapter in that it focuses merely on the views of people in 
position of status and authority. It is a top-down understanding of the Riots, like 
analyzing Lee’s accounts to study the dominant account of the Riots. Having 
analyzed the perceptions and portrayals of the Riots from the point of view of the 
PAP Old Guards, the next Chapter will study the accounts of the Riots from the 
viewpoint of the people on the ground. This group is located at the other end of the 
spectrum and unlike the PAP Old Guards, they were not in a position of authority 
or status when the Riots broke out and their accounts will tell us how the Riots 
were being perceived at the grassroots level. The findings from uncovering the 
voices from the ground will be used in either confirming or challenging the views of 







CHAPTER 4: VOICES FROM THE GROUND: ACCOUNTS 
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 
1. Introduction 
An important part of this thesis is to obtain accounts of the people at the 
grassroots level. The dominant historical narratives were based on accounts of 
political leaders who dominated the landscape of discussion during that period. It 
is critical to analyze the Riots from a bottom-up view and examine how the people 
at the grassroots level view the Riots. There were a total of forty of such subjects 
covered for this research. Twenty-eight of them were from oral recordings from 
National Archives Singapore in the forms of compact discs and audio cassettes 
while there were face-to-face interviews conducted with twelve subjects. For a 
breakdown in terms of their gender, there were twenty-nine male subjects and 
eleven female subjects. All of them had lived through the Rioting period and there 
is diversity in their age and social background. When the Riots broke out in 1964, 
some of those involved were students, housewives, policemen and factory 
workers. There were fifteen subjects who lived in hotspot areas such as Geylang 
Serai and the remaining twenty-five subjects lived in various other parts of 
Singapore. This chapter aims to analyze the personal experiences of those at the 
grassroots level who went through the harrowing period of the 1964 Racial Riots. 
Their accounts will be examined to call into question the dominant discourse on 






2. Accounts from the Grassroots 
2.1. Accounts from the Hotspot Areas 
There were fifteen subjects who lived in the hotspot areas during the Riots, which 
were primarily concentrated in the southeastern part of Singapore. Two of the 
subjects, Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed and Mohd Taib bin Ya’acob, were even 
involved in the procession as part of different Silat group contingents and provided 
first-hand accounts on the fateful day116. Cikgu Latiff even recalled; 
“Saya ikut rombongan silat Amber Rd. Dulu masa maulud nabi kumpulan budaya, 
silat, budak-budak dan perempuan semua ambil bahagian.”117  
Twelve of the subjects noted that the situation turned ugly only when the 
procession passed by Kampong Soopoo in Kallang118. Cikgu Ariff Ahmad recalled 
that during that period, Chinese communities also have religious procession of 
their own and they usually have a figurine of a religious deity or colloquially known 
as a “Dato” being paraded at the head of the procession. According to him; 
“Biasanya kalau Cina ada perarakan dorang ada tokpekong pat depan. Cina ejek 
cakap mana ada lu punya datuk. Kita maulud nabi mana ada datuk.”119 
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Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed corroborated with Cikgu Ariff Ahmad in 
mentioning that it was at Kampong Soopoo that some members of the procession 
went astray and beat up Chinese onlookers en-route to Geylang 120 . Cikgu 
Mohamed Latiff Mohamed, Cikgu Ariff, Ustaz Ibrahim Kassim, Omar bin Mahad 
and Sarimah binti Dassam recalled that the pandemonium started only when a 
Chinese onlooker threw stones at the procession along Kampong Soopoo 121 . 
Ahmad bin Abdul Rashid even noted that;  
“Di situ, Cina lempar batu-bata dekat orang Melayu yang berarak”.122 
Kampong Soopoo was the epicentre of violence on that fateful day. Even though 
the violence broke out at the Kampong Soopoo area, Mohd Taib bin Ya’acob and 
Ali bin Nasarali remembered that many of the procession members managed to 
safely make it to the Jamiyah compound at Geylang Lorong 12 and subsequently 
made their journey back home123. During these chaotic times, Mohd Taib bin 
Ya’acob added that; 
“Yang kita dengar khabar angin pasal orang Cina kena pukul. Ada dengar juga 
pasal orang Johor nak turun. Tapi itu semua khabar angin.” 124 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed who lived in Langsat Road, which is located between Joo 
Chiat and Geylang Serai, recalled having to deal with people threatening to burn 
their houses down and they were spared only due to the intervention of their 
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Chinese neighbours. On the way back home from school during the September 
riot he was caught in the melee along Victoria Road. He also personally witnessed 
the full carnage where people were being hammered and maimed125. According to 
Maryam bte Nasharuddin who lived in the Jln Alsagoff area;  
“Mak nenek yang tinggal di Jalan Alsagoff kena pindah ke rumah jiran, lebih 
belakang lagi. Sebab orang gaduh dekat dengan tempat rumah mak nenek.” 126 
Ali bin Nasarali who lived in Geylang Serai saw an illegal gathering at Jalan Pasir 
in the early hours of the morning which dispersed only upon the arrival of the Riot 
Police127. Joo Chiat was a predominantly Chinese area while Geylang Serai was 
predominantly Malay. Mohamad Yusoff bin Kassim, a police constable who was 
deployed to the no-man’s land between the two areas, recalled how his squad of 
policemen was stuck in between a Chinese mob and a Malay mob. Their presence 
was the only deterrence that prevented the two mobs from having a go at each 
other. Mohamad Yusoff bin Kassim remembered that policemen had to charge 
using their batons to disperse the mob128. Tyebally Abdulkader who lived in Joo 
Chiat area was driving along Kallang when he was hit by a bottle thrown at his car 
and he had to be warded at the General Hospital for head injury129. Dibihona bte 
Saharaji who remembered the Riots clearly; 
“Mak saya pergi Geylang nak ambil kak saya. Dalam perjalanan tu, ada nampak 
Cina bunuh Melayu. Polis nampak Mak saya sorang-sorang dan ambil dia. Mak 
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saya takut lah lepas tu nak pergi pasar atau keluar rumah pon. Dia macam 
tertekan beberapa tahun130.” 
2.2. Accounts from the Non-Hotspot Areas 
In stark contrast, most of the accounts related by the twenty-five subjects living in 
the non-hotspot areas in other parts of Singapore did not raise anything out of the 
ordinary happening in their respective estates, which were peaceful, safe and 
quiet. Manap bin A Rahman, a volunteer constabulary (V.C) in Tanjung Kling 
recalled; 
“Aku standby di Tanjong Kling. Pakai uniform. Kita tak buat rondaan. Volunteer 
setakat dalam 7-8 orang. Waktu itu sunyi. Di kampong tak apa-apa sebab ada 
polis.”131 
Salamah Mohd Yusof who lived in Thompson Road pointed out that residents 
neither had witnessed any violent clashes nor spotted patrolling police cars or 
military trucks during those jittery few days132. Mokson Mahori remembered;  
“Saya dengar pasal rusuhan menerusi radio jadi duduk aja dekat rumah sebab 
ada curfew.”133 
Residents in multi-racial neighbourhoods such as Zulkifli Mohammed and Jasmin 
bin Ahmad, who lived in Newton and Telok Blangah respectively, hardly felt 
anything at all as they were living in zones relatively free from any intrusion134.  
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2.3. Causes of the Riots 
During that time Singapore was also facing a period of Konfrontasi against 
Indonesia’s aggression and two subjects mentioned about the role of the 
Indonesians in destabilizing Singapore during that period. According to Cikgu Ariff 
Ahmad; 
“Saya dengar sebelum Malaya merdeka Sukarno dah pergi tanah Melayu mahu 
cari orang untuk melawan kemerdekaan dengan Indonesia.” 135 
Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed added that Sukarno had sent his Indonesian 
agents to conduct psychological and physical saboteur attacks on Malaysia and 
Singapore. By pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, he hoped that the Indonesian 
public will be distracted from the domestic issues back home136.  
Five subjects felt that the violence arose out of political tension within the 
Federation. Ustaz Ahmad Sonhadji bin Mohamad Milatu, a religious scholar, was 
uncomfortable with the procession as he felt that there were better ways to 
commemorate Prophet Muhammad’s birthday through other means apart from 
having a street procession. According to him; 
Setiap kumpulan yang berarak tunjuk kebolehan mereka. Saya tidak hadir kerana 
cara sudah berubah. Tak mesti kita berarak untuk sambut maulud nabi. Ada orang 
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exstremis yg menggunakan peluang perarakan merupakan suatu yang salah 
sekali.”137 
Ja’afar bin Mohamad Som pointed out; 
“Ini semua akibat ahli politik. Rusuhan ini semua berpunca daripada pergaduhan 
politik.” 138 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed highlighted that prior to 1950s, Singapore was a peaceful 
multi-racial society and it was only with the arrival of mass based politics that racial 
differences were heightened considerably139. Similarly Cikgu Suratman Markasan 
also echoed the same point; 
“Pandangan saya sekarang ini, saya melihat bahawa yang memainkan peranan 
yang penting ialah pemimpin. Rakyat biasa yang tak berfikir waras akan mengikut. 
Pemimpin harus sedar tanggung jawab mereka itu berat.”140 
Ustaz Ibrahim Kassim even went as far as saying that that there was nothing racial 
about the Riots and it broke out purely because of political reasons141. Cikgu 
Mohamed Latiff Mohamed did not think that UMNO was the one who instigated the 
Riots. He felt that it was imprudent for UMNO to start a riot during a Muslim 
religious procession and Malays in Singapore were also overwhelmingly 
outnumbered by the Chinese thus it would be dangerous and costly for the Malays 
to be involved in racial riots142 . He pointed out that since neither UMNO nor 
Malays in Singapore stand to gain anything from an outbreak of interracial 
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violence in Singapore, the destruction caused from the violence would outweigh 
any political gains UMNO might stand to gain from the Riots143.    
Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed also came up with a theory blaming the outbreak 
of the Riots due to a spontaneous psychological mass effect on the participants 
involved in the procession. He explained that it is natural for a large group of 
people participating in any religious procession to snap and run amok when an 
external party acted provocatively to disturb or insult them. Their strength in 
numbers will further boost their confidence into behaving aggressively. In this 
case, he pointed out that a large number of participants in the procession 
commemorating the Prophet Muhammad birthday snapped when a member of the 
Chinese onlooker threw a bottle at them. Chinese along the way were then 
subjected to senseless beatings as a spontaneous reaction by the Malay 
procession members to the bottle-throwing incident. Having strength in numbers 
further emboldened some of the procession members to react violently in bashing 
up the Chinese144.  
Six of the subjects pointed the blame at members of the Chinese Secret Societies 
for the Riots145. Ahmad bin Abdul Rashid highlighted that the place where the first 
clashes occurred was in Kampong Soopoo which he said that; 
“Pat situ banyak lorong-lorong jadi Cina lepas campak boleh lari. Sebelah itu 
kubur. Lepas itu jembatan Sungai Lorong Tiga. Dalam situ Cina masak candu. 
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Tempat situ memang sarang gangster. Tempat mereka menyeludup dan buat 
candu. Kampong Soopoo memang tempat gangster.”146 
Nasiari bin Sunee and Zabariah Ali pointed out that in most villages in Singapore, 
they coexisted peacefully with their Chinese neighbours and trouble were usually 
caused by external rogue elements intruding into the village territories147. Mohd 
Taib bin Ya’acob and Maryam bte Nasharuddin remembered that for the Malay 
residents living in Geylang Serai, the Chinese gangsters from Tai Seng were the 
perpetual threat they need to be wary of 148 . However Cikgu Mohamed Latiff 
Mohamed felt that it was highly improbable that the Chinese Secret Societies were 
the ones who started the Riots. He felt that the Chinese Secret Societies never 
engaged in any form of interracial violence before as there was nothing for them to 
gain from such tension and violence. He added that they were also apolitical and 
thus it was unlikely that they were the ones who had started the Riots149.  
2.4. Interracial Relationship on the Ground 
Interracial relationship was another major theme most of the subjects touched on. 
Most of them revealed during the Riots that they were sheltered by their Chinese 
neighbours. Zabariah Ali and Zainul Abidin Rasheed recalled their Chinese 
neighbours were the ones who had protected them and the threats came mainly 
from intruding Chinese strangers who were not from their village 150 . Sukarti 
Asmoin even highlighted that the Chinese gangsters who patrolled her village had 
armed themselves with swords and dutifully protected the villagers, irrespective of 
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their races 151 . Cikgu Suratman Markasan recalled that even the Chinese at 
Kampong Soopoo protected their Malay neighbours during the Riots152.  
There existed a small commune of Baweanese community in the middle of the 
Chinese enclave of Chinatown. Their communal lodging is known as the Pondok 
Peranakan Gelam Club or commonly refered to as Pondok. Pondok residents 
such as Nasiari bin Sunee pointed out that even though Chinatown was a haven 
for Secret Society groups, yet these gangsters never harmed the Pondok 
residents even when the rioting was at its worst153. Another Pondok resident, 
Mohd Awi bin Ador, further added;  
“Cina dekat kedai cakap, “Jangan takut dengan gua.”. Besoknya di kedai, Cina 
kedai semua cakap jangan takut. Diorang cakap, “Nanti kalau orang lain masuk 
sini kita larang mereka masuk.”.”154 
On their part, Ahmad bin Sitri noted that the Pondok residents agreed that nobody 
within their ranks should participate in any form of racial violence and if any of 
them were guilty of such offence, they would be on their own to face the music. He 
also added that residents from Geylang who heard of the story of the Pondok 
residents were shocked to learn of the nature of the relationship the latter had with 
their Chinese neighbours155.         
In the other parts of Singapore in the Malay-majority villages, the same level of 
interracial protection was also noted. Manap bin A Rahman, Mohd Taib bin 
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Ya’acob, Salamah Mohd Yusof and Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed pointed out 
that the token few Chinese residents were protected from harm by their Malay 
neighbours in their villages in the Malay-concentrated Southern Islands, Lorong 
Marican, Thompson Road and Amber Road areas156. In areas where there was a 
fairly balanced composition of Malays and Chinese such as in Henderson Road 
and Newton Road, Cikgu Ariff Ahmad and Zulkifli Mohammed  recalled there was 
hardly any trouble as everyone knew each other and there existed no acrimony 
between the residents157. Because of the curfew imposed, people were in a rush 
trying to get back home before the deadline. Omar bin Mahad, Maarof Salleh and 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed recounted their accounts of Chinese bus drivers and truck 
drivers who went out of their way in letting Malay passengers board their vehicles 
and even gave soothing words of advice for them to take good care of 
themselves 158 . Relationship with Chinese contacts remained cordial after the 
Riots. Jasmin bin Ahmad who was a Primary Six student at Batu Berlayer Primary 
School remembered;  
“Tak ada sekolah sebab sekolah tutup. Sekolah buka balik lepas curfew dah tak 
ada tapi so far semua bagus. Selepas riots semua orang berjaga-jaga tapi 
hubungan baik.”159 
Omar bin Mahad and Ali bin Nasarali noted that the Riots did not put any strain on 
their relationship with their Chinese colleagues or superiors in their workplace. Life 
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went on as per normal and they continued to treat each other normally with the 
usual banter160.     
2.5. Effects and Aftermath of the Riots 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed remembered that when the curfew was announced, 
everybody made the rush back home to try to beat the curfew deadline and this 
led to severe congestion as the traffic infrastructure was unable to support the 
traffic bottlenecks at many major roads and intersections161. Omar bin Mahad 
recalled that those who were unable to make it back home in time were forced to 
stay overnight at their workplace162.  
People’s normal routine was affected as a result of the shutdown. Sumitera Mohd 
Letak, a midwife, recalled her colleagues being transported to different parts of 
Singapore in Police vans to deliver babies. She herself had to assist in the delivery 
of a neighbour’s baby as the midwife assigned to the latter was late to arrive163. 
Zabariah Ali, a student at Tun Sri Lanang School said that; 
“Dekat sekolah kita ada ‘latihan darurat’. Kita taruk biskut dalam tin dan taruk 
nama kita. Lepas beberapa lama tak ada apa-apa, tin diberi balik.”164 
The Riots did breed an environment of fear and paranoia in Singapore. During the 
evening of the Riots, Siti Fatimah binte Parti who was living in a predominantly 
Chinese village in Mount Pleasant Road recalled moving further up the road to 
stay in a neighbouring predominantly Malay village, prompting their amused 
                                               
160 Mahad, O. Education in Singapore. [audio casette]., Nasarali, A. (personal communication, July 6, 2012). 
161 Rasheed, Z. A. (personal communication, July 2, 2012). 
162 Mahad, O. Education in Singapore. [audio casette]. 
163 Mohd Letak, S. (1997). Medical Services in Singapore. [CD]. Oral History Centre. 
164 Ali, Z. Education in Singapore. [audio casette]. She remembered going through emergency drills in school to better 
prepare students facing future emergency scenarios. At school, students were to bring biscuits to be stored in empty tins 




Chinese neighbour to ask them on why they were packing up and moving out for 
the night. She clarified that her family felt it was safer for them to be surrounded by 
Malays even though their Chinese neighbours were neither threatening nor portray 
any aggressive tendencies165. In another case, Zainul Abidin Rasheed recalled 
hitch hiking a ride back home at the back of a lorry together with his Malay 
schoolmates. When the lorry broke down along Victoria Road, the Chinese 
bystanders were alarmed at the sight of the group of Malay boys at the back of the 
lorry, even though on normal days this would scarcely raise any bell ringing166.  
The Police was also swift in arresting suspects linked to the Riots. On that fateful 
night itself, Cikgu Suratman Markasan remembered;  
“Waktu itu saya sudah tinggal di Kampong Tengah di bahagian Pasir Panjang, 
semua penduduk lelaki disuruh keluar dan siapa yang ada luka diasingkan. Saya 
waktu itu disuruh balik ke rumah. Siapa yang ada luka akan diselidik. Jikalau 
jawapan mereka tidak memuaskan, mereka akan dibawa balik ke balai..”167 
He also added that the police also arrested a large number of people suspected to 
be involved in the Riots, such as the owner of the Jubilee Restaurant who was 
arrested for his role in providing free food for the Malay rioters168. Ustaz Ibrahim 
Kassim felt that there were some who were arrested and imprisoned unjustly. 
Being a member of an opposition party, he was caught in the dragnet purportedly 
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for being involved in the Riots although he felt that the actual reason was because 
he was too vocal against the government169.  
2.6. Legacy of the Riots 
Two subjects mentioned that the Riots did affect their relationship with the 
Chinese. According to Cikgu Ariff;  
“Hubungan Melayu dengan Cina macam api dalam sekam. Maknanya di luar 
nampak baik tapi dalam hati lain.” 170 
Wagina Rewan added; 
“Lepas curfew, hubungan Cina dan Melayu renggang sikit. Banyak orang percaya 
ini semua sebab gangster punya pasal. Hubungan Melayu dengan Cina renggang 
agak lama sebelum kembali baik macam dulu.” 171 
The didactic values within the dominant discourse on the Riots stress on themes 
such as the dangers of deep-seated ethnic fault lines in Singapore society. Yet 
from the interviews with those at the grassroots level, only two subjects mentioned 
about being wary of the Chinese during the post-Rioting period. Moreover, only 
three other subjects mentioned the didactic values propagated by the dominant 
discourse. Sarimah binti Dassam and Siti Fatimah binte Parti each pointed out that 
in revisiting their country’s dark past the next generation should never repeat the 
same mistake again and must live together in harmony irrespective of the colour of 
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their skin172. Zainul Abidin Rasheed highlighted how racial strifes in other countries 
have shown how it can easily tear up societies. He feels that the primordial 
instincts are still inherent within the society and sometimes they may forget other 
interests. It is because of this that the society must ensure that succeeding 
generations do not take racial harmony for granted173.  
The Malay community also faced a bitter backlash as a result of the legacy from 
the Riots. Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed argued that the Riots led to a de-
ghettoization policy adopted by the State to prevent the formation of ethnic 
enclaves and on top of that Malays were also gradually phased out from being part 
of sensitive security apparatuses such as the Police and Armed Forces174.  
3. Assessment 
The accounts narrated by the laypeople give us an insight into how the Riots were 
being perceived and remembered at the everyday grassroots level. Some of the 
information and details gleaned from these accounts corroborated with the official 
accounts but majority of the accounts differed from the dominant discourse. There 
were some common themes echoed strongly by the subjects but were absent in 
the dominant discourse. These underexplored themes will be discussed in this part 
of the Chapter. 
3.1. Spontaneous Outbreak of Violence 
According to those who were part of the procession contingents, there was barely 
any tension in the air. Far from it, there was an upbeat and happy atmosphere at 
the Padang on 21st July 1964. The diverse profiles of the participating members of 
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the procession reflected the family-friendly environment of the day. Nobody had 
expected an outbreak of violence to break out shortly a few hours later. Most 
attributed it to a number of spontaneous causal effects which led to the exchange 
of the first blow.  
Cikgu Latiff came up with the theory of a spontaneous psychological mass effect 
as members of large religious groups are most likely to be governed by emotion 
rather than logic in their behaviour. They may display certain tribal traits to defend 
the group in carrying out retaliatory strikes when provoked by an external agent, 
especially when they possess strength in numbers. The procession members only 
turned unruly and violent after they had passed Kampong Soopoo and news had 
travelled throughout the contingents about a bottle-throwing incident purportedly 
caused by a Chinese onlooker. The outbreak of the violence is thus a reaction to 
an aggressive instigation from an external agent which is the Chinese. 
These accounts rule out the possibility of a pre-planned violence as propagated by 
the dominant discourse on the 1964 Racial Riots, since the people on the ground 
were genuinely surprised when the Riots broke out. The people at the grassroots 
level were caught offguard and were confident that the initial sparks to the violence 
were caused by juvenile hooligans. 
3.2. The Guilty Parties 
Another common theme which was brought up quite regularly was the issue of 
who was to be blamed for the Riots. Even though majority of them said that the 
Riots broke out due to spontaneous reasons, many were also quick to point out 




conducive for the outbreak of an interracial riot. The popular perception on the 
ground was that the mayhem happened as a result of the actions of the politicians, 
even though they might not have orchestrated the actual Riots itself. This is 
because their reckless politicking had created an environment which was 
conducive for an interracial clash to break out. They believed that since the 
politicial leaders have immense amount of influence on their followers, then they 
should take responsibility and ownership of their political actions as their rhetoric 
can raise the tension level amongst the different races. However it is interesting to 
note that none of the subjects directly blamed UMNO, SUMNO or the Ultras for 
purposely plotting the Riots, even though the dominant discourse pointed to 
UMNO, specifically members of the Ultras as being responsible for the Riots. 
Subjects such as Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed even stressed that he did not 
think that UMNO was the one who had instigated the Riots, since it was 
disadvantageous for them to carry out such action. Rather than benefiting them, it 
may be detrimental for them to follow through with such a violent strategy.  
The Malay subjects covered in this research also pointed to the Chinese as the 
ones who had instigated the first move thus absolving the Malays of the 
responsibility of starting the Riots. They provoked the Malay procession members 
and they argued that trouble only started when the procession marched into the 
predominantly Chinese Kampong Soopoo. It was popularly agreed upon by the 
subjects that the catalyst to the Riot was when a Chinese onlooker threw a bottle 
into the procession which provoked retaliatory strikes by the Malay marchers. This 
was the dominant account concerning the principal cause of the Riots amongst 
those at the ground even though many of them were not there at Kampong 




throwing anecdote countless times from various acquaintances and it evolved to 
be a “historical” fact amongst the laypeople at the grassroots level. Over time there 
may be sensational elements added to the anecdotes; for instance, Ahmad bin 
Abdul Rashid pointed out that instead of bottles being thrown, rocks were thrown 
instead. 
There were also other parties who were blamed for the Riots. The Chinese Secret 
Societies were singled out for being a menace whose presence always loomed 
threateningly in the background. Kampong Soopoo, the place where the first 
outbreak of violence broke out was notoriously known to be a lair for Chinese 
Secret Societies. For Malay villagers in Geylang Serai, the threats posed by 
Chinese Secret Society members in neighbouring Joo Chiat and Tai Seng were 
real and they were in heightened state of alert against these Secret Societies 
during the Rioting period. 
Then there were also widespread rumours of a clandestine Malay martial arts 
group from the Peninsula coming down to Singapore to help the Malay community 
here against the Chinese. Such rumours only served to destabilize the condition 
further. It would embolden the Malay rioters further as they will anticipate the 
coming of their Malay brethrens from the Peninsula to help them.  
Surprisingly only Cikgu Ariff Ahmad and Cikgu Mohamed Latiff Mohamed actually 
mentioned about the roles of the Indonesians and the Konfrontasi campaign. The 
Indonesians did not feature amongst the consciousness of the people as among 
those to be blamed. This was probably due to the clandestine nature of the way 




embedded so deep within Singapore’s society that it was not surprising that the 
local masses failed to spot their role in destabilizing Singapore.  
In the end there were some factors, such as the PAP-UMNO conflict, which was 
more compelling than the others, but essentially it was a combination of many 
different factors which contributed to the outbreak and acceleration of interracial 
violence in Singapore in 1964. The dominant discourse emphasized solely on the 
role of racist politicians within UMNO as the guilty parties in causing the 1964 
Racial Riots. Yet such a view is not shared by those at the grassroots level. Apart 
from the politicians, the subjects interviewed also named the Chinese, Chinese 
secret societies and clandestine Malay martial arts groups as guilty parties in 
instigating the Riots as well as emphasizing the spontaneous nature of the Riots. 
These views are incongruent with that of the dominant discourse. 
3.3. Localized Riot 
For all the damages caused by the Riots, the violence was essentially a localized 
one. It was concentrated mainly around the southeastern part of Singapore in 
places such as Joo Chiat, Geylang Serai and Kallang. All the cases of attacks and 
injuries resulting from the violence which were mentioned by the subjects covered 
in this chapter were traced to these hotspot areas. The subjects living in the 
Geylang Serai area were the ones who felt the greatest fear during the rioting 
period. Their concerns were couched in real terms as mob violence happened 
right at their doorstep. The threat of physical harm to themselves, their families 
and properties were real and the possibility of it happening was very high. 
Subjects living in other parts of Singapore reported of experiencing little or no 




the Riots either from other people or through the various news outlets. The 
dominant discourse tends to describe the 1964 Racial Riots as an event of 
national magnitude which gravely affected everyone in Singapore. However it was 
clear from the interviews with those on the ground that the main clashes occurred 
mainly in the southeastern part of Singapore and that the other parts of the island 
were largely untouched by acts of violence.  
3.4. Impact of the Curfew 
Though most Singaporeans were not directly involved in the Riots, the senseless 
interracial violence put everyone on a heightened state of suspicion which bred 
self-paranoia amongst them. People were tensed up not so much because they 
were directly involved or had witnessed the actual violence, but more because of 
the curfews on top of everything else. Very few of them may have witnessed any 
actual violence but one common theme many recalled was the curfew that was 
imposed. Many were caught unprepared by the Riots and the subsequent curfew. 
One can only picture a sense of utter panic in the air in the urban centres with 
people rushing in all directions trying to get back home before the curfew deadline. 
Such chaotic scenes were repeated all across Singapore. The sudden halt in daily 
movements also brought about major disruptions especially to those who worked 
in critical positions.  
The curfew brought with it a surreal sense of emptiness in the street confining 
everyone to their home and turning Singapore into a ghostown. The total complete 
shutdown of a bustling Singapore certainly shocked everyone. The pandemonium 
was initially only at the hotspot areas where the clashes broke out. But the 




domestic sphere due to the dwindling food supply at home. Curfews meant that 
people had to stay at home and they were unable to venture out even to their 
neighbourhood shops or markets to purchase goods and provisions. They were 
forced to rely on whatever that was available at home and often went hungry when 
the food supply ran low. The gravity of the situation usually did not hit most of 
them until the full effects of the curfew hit home.  
It was then not surprising that the curfew is a recurring theme which surfaced 
amongst the subjects covered for this thesis. The dominant discourse described 
the 1964 Racial Riots as a national emergency but the actual violence did not 
spread to all parts of Singapore. Indeed as discussed earlier, the non-hotspot 
areas were largely unaffected by actual cases of violence. However from the 
anecdotal accounts from those on the ground, this study found that for majority of 
the people on the ground, the experience from the Riots which they could relate to 
the most was the curfew, as it had touched them on a personal level.   
3.5. Peaceful on the Ground 
In the dominant discourse, the Riots was often depicted as a bleak chapter in 
Singapore’s history. There seemed to be only pessimism in the air, where 
primordial instinct superseded rationality and empathy. However the dominant 
view amongst the masses pointed to the opposite instead. Even when supposedly 
interracial relationship was at its nadir, cases of interracial protection were widely 
reported across all of Singapore even at the hotspot areas. The situation was 
therefore not as bleak as what was reported. On the issue of interracial 
relationship, majority of the subjects remained cordial with their Chinese 




created some distrust amongst the different communities. There were scores of 
anecdotal accounts of Malay families being protected by their Chinese neighbours 
in a Chinese majority village and vice-versa. Then there were also anecdotal 
accounts of complete strangers helping members of the other races during that 
critical period.  
Although two subjects mentioned that the Riots did affect the nature of the 
relationship between the Malays and Chinese for some of the subjects, but for the 
overwhelming majority, it barely caused any dent in their relationship with their 
Chinese contacts. Years of interracial friendship forged based on mutual trust 
ensured that they passed the litmus test of racial harmony when the Riots broke 
out. This particular finding directly challenged the dominant discourse which 
blamed the 1964 Racial Riots on the purported deep-seated ethnic fault lines 
within Singapore society. Even when directly confronted with the full-blown Racial 
Riots, majority of the races did not react emotively to the violence. They did not let 
their primordial instinct influence them and treated their acquaintances from the 
other races with normalcy. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the voices of the people at the grassroots level on the Riots. 
Their personal experiences in the period of the 1964 Racial Riots have pieced 
together a bottom-up history of the incident. This particular group is largely ignored 
by the other studies done on the Riots as illustrated in the previous Chapters. 
There are a few interesting revelations on the Riots which challenge the dominant 
account on the Riots. Their candid recollections on the Riots include their 




condition in Singapore and the nature of interethnic relationships amongst those 
on the ground. Thus far this thesis has analyzed perceptions of the Riots from the 
viewpoints of the different strata of society within Singapore. The next Chapter will 
look at how non-Singaporean individuals within their official capacities as 






CHAPTER 5: ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS: ACCOUNTS BY 
ALLIANCE LEADERS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS 
1. Introduction 
Accounts of the 1964 Racial Riots by members of the PAP, as well as accounts by 
other groups within their official capacities will be analyzed in this chapter. 
Perceptions of the Riots by government officials from Australia, United States and 
India will be analysed in order to gain a holistic understanding of the Riots. This 
chapter will also examine reports of the Riots by members of the Alliance coalition, 
notably from SUMNO and UMNO. The dominant discourse on the 1964 Racial 
Riots is heavily influenced by accounts from the PAP Old Guards. SUMNO and 
UMNO, as PAP’s fiercest political adversaries during the period, have been 
singled out by the dominant discourse as the principal instigators of the Riots. It 
would be pertinent to uncover the accounts of the Riots from their perspectives. 
Newspaper during the period was an important source for comments made by 
Alliance leaders based on their views of the Riots. In later years, the Malaysian 
leaders would also give interviews and write memoirs from their recollection of 
incidents during the period. There are also interviews with SUMNO and UMNO 
leaders such as Tunku and Khir Johari (available in the National Archives 
Singapore), which recorded their accounts of the 1964 Racial Riots.        
The Australian Government followed closely the political developments in 
Singapore when it was part of Malaysia. Recently, its diplomatic cables, which 




Singapore with their home government in Canberra, were declassified and made 
available online for public viewing. Their cable correspondence reveals that their 
diplomats were close to the government leaders of Singapore and Malaysia and 
they were also privy to some insider information. Further to this, there was an 
intelligence note by Thomas L. Hughes, the Director in the United States Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, to the United States Secretary of State reporting on 
the Riots. These accounts are examined for the purpose of this study because the 
Americans, Australians and British are third parties and are largely in a position of 
neutrality, being observers while the events unravelled before them.The accounts 
will be analyzed to see if they either support or challenge the dominant discourse 
on the Riots.  
2. Official Accounts 
2.1. Accounts from members of the Alliance Coalition 
Sahid Sahooman, a SUMNO Youth leader, recalled that there was a mass exodus 
of SUMNO leaders to PAP prior to the 1963 General Elections which led to 
widespread angry sentiment amongst the Malay community who viewed these 
people as being traitors to the Malay community 175 . On the issue of political 
instigation, Sahid pointed out that Lee Kuan Yew was also to be blamed for the 
escalating tension as he was openly questioning the issue of Malay rights. He 
added that Albar should not be blamed for his rhetoric as he was merely 
answering the accusations directed against him brought about by Lee. 
Sahid was one of the safety officers during the SUMNO Convention at Brightstar 
Theatre in Pasir Panjang in 1964. According to him, there was a large crowd which 
                                               




turned out in droves for the Convention and it was so packed and chaotic that the 
main door leading to the theatre was shattered by the trampling crowd who rushed 
to get inside the theatre. He recalled that the crowd did not consist exclusively of 
UMNO or SUMNO members as there were also Malays not affliated to either 
groups turning up for the Convention as well. The mood on that day was very 
tense, which he attributed to the grievances the Malay community harboured of 
being oppressed living under the PAP’s rule. Sahid viewed Albar in a positive light 
and explained that his emotive political rhetoric was designed to boost the morale 
of Singapore Malays who were humiliated by PAP in the 1963 General Elections. 
When Albar appeared on stage as the keynote speaker, the crowd were ecstatic 
and did not want him to end his speech. The mood was uncontrollable with people 
shouting for Othman Wok to be killed as well as labelling PAP as being anti-
Islam176.   
Sahid disagreed with blaming UMNO and SUMNO for starting the Riots. He was 
part of the UMNO contingent during the procession on 21st July 1964 and clarified 
that Yusof Ishak was not jeered by UMNO members at the Padang, as the jeers 
came from another group at a different part of the Padang. He recalled that during 
the procession, the first outbreak of violence broke out at the Barisan Sosialis 
stronghold of Kallang when a Chinese onlooker threw a bottle at the procession. In 
the subsequent melee, he saw groups of Malay juvenile delinquents and 
gangsters who appeared out of nowhere to beat up the Chinese bystanders and 
smashing cars parked by the side. These unsavoury elements were not from any 
of the participating contingents and he was sure they were not UMNO 
                                               




members177. Sahid’s account was corroborated by Ahmad Taff, another leader 
from SUMNO. Ahmad blamed the outbreak of violence on some bad hats and 
even went as far as saying that there was no racial element involved in it178. A day 
later, his coalition partner Lee Kim Chuan, the Secretary for Singapore Alliance, 
released a statement warning people to be vigilant of rogue elements aiming for 
instability in Singapore. However he was very vague about the internal and 
external threats and did not name any specific group179.  
The Ministers in the Alliance coalition in Malaysia did not straight away point the 
finger at Lee and PAP for starting the Riots. During the days immediately 
preceding the Riots, Tunku blamed the Indonesian and their Konfrontasi plot for 
starting the Riots. He was on an official trip to the United States when the Riots 
broke out and he released a statement from Washington saying that he had 
evidence that Indonesia was behind the Riots180. For Tunku, it was only much 
later, after Singapore was separated from Malaysia, that he revealed in an 
interview that he felt Lee was too aggressive in his approach when dealing with 
the Federal government. Tunku felt that Lee went into the merger with Malaysia 
with his eyes wide open, thus Lee knew perfectly how the political system in the 
Federation operated. Yet after merger, he sung a different tune and challenged the 
system by challenging the core aspect of Malaysia’s politics which accorded 
special rights to the Malays181.   
Another insightful account would be from Khir Johari, the Federal Minister for 
Agriculture and Cooperative, as he was the point man for UMNO in Singapore who 
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was tasked to be the Minister-in-charge of SUMNO’s activities182. He was active 
on the ground and remained in Singapore even after the departure of Tun Razak 
and his entourage of Federal ministers in the aftermath of the Riots183. Khir was 
considered to be one of the moderates within the Party and in an interview, he 
stressed that Albar neither had much control over matters nor wielded an undue 
level of influence on UMNO or SUMNO184. Tunku also shared Khir’s sentiments 
and said that the Ultras within UMNO were a bunch of opportunists and had scant 
influence on him and other Party leaders when making Party decisions185. Both 
Tunku and Khir implied that Albar and Ultras were constantly being kept on the 
Party’s leash by the moderates thus challenging the dominant discourse which 
blamed Albar and the Ultras for instigating the Riots by pushing UMNO to adopt an 
aggressive communal approach against the PAP.  
2.2. Accounts from the Australian Diplomatic Cables 
In a diplomatic cable by William Pritchett, the Australian Deputy High 
Commissioner in Malaysia, he noted that the Singapore Malay community was an 
important community even though they formed only 14% of Singapore’s 
population. PAP worked hard to win the hearts of the Malay electorate but some of 
their policies such as the Kallang redevelopment projects were viewed 
suspiciously by the Malay community and exploited by UMNO politicians for 
political points. One example highlighted by Pritchett was the Kallang 
redevelopment project, where UMNO politicians like Syed Jaafar Albar exploited 
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and depicted it as PAP’s plan to discriminate against the Malays even though the 
Malays formed only 10% of the residents affected by the redevelopment186. 
According to Max Loveday, the Australian Acting High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur, communal tension had been steadily brewing largely as a result of 
provocations by Ultras such as Albar. Moderate UMNO leaders were unable to 
reign in on extremists like Albar as they commanded a large following in the Party. 
UMNO risked losing such followers to other more extreme communal parties such 
as PMIP if they were to clamp down on the Ultras187.  
Pritchett managed to obtain information from Singapore’s Special Branch and he 
believed that the Riots neither had any pre-meditated planning nor provocation by 
any organization which led them to conclude that the outburst of violence during 
the procession was sparked off spontaneously188. He added that the Malays who 
started the disturbances were not marching behind any political banners on that 
day and neither did they receive any backings from any political parties. The 
violence was started and subsequently was prolonged as a result of the actions by 
hooligans and Secret Societies189. Pritchett noted that the atmosphere during that 
day was one of heightened communal tension, the result of a series of emotive 
speeches by racist politicians, the ongoing Indonesian psychological warfare 
campaign aimed at instigating racial tension as well as the religious fervour arising 
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from the gathering and procession190. A combination of all these factors created a 
very tense atmosphere amongst those who participated in the procession. During 
the aftermath of the 1964 Racial Riots, Pritchett pointed out that the political 
leaders from both sides were thoroughly shaken by the sheer intensity of the 
violence and they were genuine in not wanting to prolong it further191.    
Pritchett also felt that Lee Kuan Yew should shoulder part or most of the blame for 
the outbreak of the Riots. He did not mince his words in blaming Lee for escalating 
the tension to a tipping point when the Riots occurred. Lee had shown a major 
temperamental inability to deal with the Malays. His manners in conducting politics 
was highly unpalatable to them and he underestimated the importance of personal 
relationship in Malaysian politics. Lee gravely unsettled even the most moderate 
Malays with his radical, non-communal and socialist Malaysian programme which 
sought to get the Indians and Chinese to run the country under the aegis of the 
Malays 192 . Pritchett noted that it was simply a case of Lee pursuing PAP’s 
programmes too fast and too hard while showing little interest in cultivating good 
relations with the Federal government193. Pritchett added that in the immediate 
days after the Riots with the scars still fresh on people’s mind, Lee addressed the 
consular corps on the dangers of communalism and the need to reign in on racial 
extremists which further irritated the Federal government who viewed it as a subtle 
criticism against them194. It did not help that during this period Indonesia was 
pursuing an active psychological warfare campaign designed to destabilize the 
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Malaysian Federation under the Konfrontasi plot, as Pritchett highlighted the 
circulation of seditious racial pamphlets as part of their propaganda campaign in 
Singapore195. From Pritchett’s assessment, it seemed that Lee viewed the riot 
purely as a communal and racial venture without internalizing his own contributing 
role in directing PAP’s aggressive politicking strategy during the period, which also 
played a big part in leading up to the outbreak of the Riots.  
2.3. Accounts from United States 
Thomas L. Hughes, the Director in the United States Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, blamed UMNO for instigating the Riots. According to him, the Riot was 
the climax to a long-running anti-PAP campaign carried out by UMNO. UMNO was 
still reeling from being trounced by PAP in Singapore’s 1963 general elections and 
they were worried that PAP will compete directly against UMNO for the Federal 
government. The turning point in this anti-PAP campaign was during the SUMNO 
Convention in Pasir Panjang as according to Hughes, “The rally apparently 
succeeded in firing always latent Malay anatagonism against the Chinese” 196 . 
Hughes was also convinced that although the region faced hostile threats from 
Indonesia, there was no evidence of direct Indonesian complicity in the Riots197. 
3. Assessment  
The dominant accounts would point the blame to UMNO and the Ultras for 
instigating the Riots but in analyzing the accounts by members of the Alliance 
coalition, we are able to glean their side of the story on the Riots. Expectedly they 
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denied being the principal troublemakers and argued that they were unfairly 
blamed for the 1964 Racial Riots. Sahid Sahooman, a SUMNO youth leader, 
explained that Syed Jaafar Albar, the chief villain in the dominant discourse, was a 
victim of the PAP’s politicking. UMNO moderates such as Tunku and Khir Johari 
also stressed that the moderates were the dominant faction in UMNO and that the 
Ultras were only a weak minority with scant influence within the Party. However 
the Australian Acting High Commissioner Loveday pointed out that it was the 
Ultras who were the dominant faction within UMNO and that they exerted a high 
degree of influence on the Party leaders as they commanded a large number of 
followers who subscribed to their extreme form of communal politics. Loveday’s 
account is incongruent with the earlier remarks mentioned made by Tunku and 
Khir who commented that the Ultras have very little power and influence within 
UMNO. It raised the question of whether the Ultras either assumed a fully-
controlled subordinate role or were hugely influential within UMNO and were able 
to dictate their agendas within the Party. Both Tunku and Khir who were from the 
moderate faction within UMNO might not be readily upfront in admitting that the 
Ultra faction was indirectly steering UMNO’s course of action during the period. 
This was so especially since the moderate faction was the one who dominated the 
positions of authority within the Party during that period.      
It is worth noting that even though the Ultras might not have planned the Riots, 
their reckless actions in the days leading up to the procession severely 
destabilized the condition on the ground. For example during the Convention at 
Pasir Panjang, Albar’s inflammatory keynote speech drew rave responses from 
the audience members. Sahid even admitted that the crowd went wild and even 




highlighted that this Convention was a watershed in the escalation of interracial 
tension that culminated in the outbreak of the Riots. However Sahid rejected any 
views blaming either UMNO or SUMNO for fermenting the interracial tension on 
the ground even though the foreign sources from Australia, United States and 
India contradict his many statements by listing down evidences which point out to 
reckless behaviour on the part of politicians from UMNO and SUMNO such as 
openly inciting racial tension in their speeches.    
It is also interesting to note that Tunku and his cabinet ministers did not blame Lee 
Kuan Yew or the PAP for being the guilty Party for the outbreak of the 1964 Racial 
Riots during the immediate aftermath. It was probably due to their pragmatic 
foresight that they directed the blame at the Indonesians in the days after the 
incident happened. They were being cautious and would not want to aggravate the 
situation on the ground further by wrangling in another round of political row with 
Lee and the PAP. It was only decades after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia 
that Tunku was more forthcoming in stating that Lee and the PAP should shoulder 
part of the blame for the Riots. 
The accounts also pointed to the role of the Indonesians which was a prominent 
player in the background. Even though the United States believed that the 
Indonesians were not complicit in the 1964 Racial Riots, Australian Deputy High 
Commissioner Pritchett and UMNO leaders strongly believed that the Indonesian 
Konfrontasi campaign led to the increased level of interracial tension in Singapore.     
Pritchett’s cables provided a fresh look at the Riots by being scathing in his 
analysis of the role of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP. He felt that the PAP was too 




committed the cardinal sin in Malaysian politics by attacking the communal-based 
system which was the very foundation of Malaysian politics. By aggressively 
pushing their agenda, Lee and the PAP should accept some degree of 
responsibility for the hostile political atmosphere which contributed to the 
heightened interracial tension in Singapore.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter studied the 1964 Racial Riots from different perspectives by looking 
at the accounts of officials from different countries. This chapter also played the 
role of a devil’s advocate to the State’s authoritative accounts on the Riots by 
presenting the views of UMNO leaders. As what is to be expected, their accounts 
were markedly different from the State’s dominant account of the Riots. The 
diplomats from other countries were privy to sensitive information by leaders from 
both sides of the causeway and their accounts provided an intimate look into the 
unravelling of the incident from an outsider’s point of view. The accounts from this 
chapter contribute to a holistic assessment of the Riots by providing an external 






CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
1. Sinking into the Narratives 
The narrative that has defined the causes, nature and legacy of the 1964 Racial 
Riots has been the singular dominant and official account of the State, even now 
almost fifty years later. The so-called State’s account was heavily influenced by 
Lee Kuan Yew’s perspective of the event, whereby Singaporeans are supposed to 
take away key “lessons” from history. The main message in this historical event is 
that racial harmony in multi-racial Singapore is of upmost importance especially 
since the Riots was a result of communal politics. There exist deep seated racial 
fault-lines in Singapore’s society and insensitive remarks could be seen as 
potential dangers resulting in social disruptions. This has led to politics of fear and 
this narrative has been used for decades to justify the out-of-bound markers on 
critical comments that may or may not carry a whiff of racial provocation.  This 
“official” account has been so pervasive that it has been incorporated in 
Singapore’s history and social studies secondary textbooks to be learnt by 
thousands of young citizens. This singular dominant account severely impedes 
Singaporeans’ ability to fully understand the Riots and its consequences. The main 
problem with this account is the fact that it is singular, told from a single 
perspective and is an elite account of the event. This thesis seeks to interrogate 
this narrative, to uncover other perspectives and other voices for a more 
comprehensive and perhaps more complex account of the event. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to investigate and determine the actual cause of the Riots. 




more light to understanding of the causes, nature and impact of this event in 
Singapore’s history.      
2. The Blame Game: Who is to be blamed for the Riots? 
The dominant account, which is heavily based on Lee’s interpretation of the Riots, 
pointed the blame squarely at the UMNO Ultras for being the principal instigator to 
the violence. However there was a shift in stance even from Lee himself. During 
the immediate days after the Riots broke out, he initially blamed the Indonesians 
for instigating the Riots. Moving ahead a few decades later, Lee’s accounts on the 
Riots shifted the blame entirely on the Ultras. This may be largely due to the fact 
that it would be imprudent for Lee to aggravate tensions further with UMNO by 
straightaway pointing the finger at the Ultras, especially when Singapore was still 
part of Malaysia then. Currently the dominant account portrayed the Ultras as 
being too aggressive in pushing for a system of politics which put Malay rights on 
a pedestal. Their form of communal politics was seen as being discriminatory and 
at odds with PAP’s slogan of a Malaysian Malaysia which was portrayed as a 
more inclusive and fairer approach to politics. The Ultras were also portrayed as a 
reckless group which adopted aggressive strategies with scant regards for the due 
consequences of their actions. The SUMNO Convention in Pasir Panjang was 
used by the PAP leaders to highlight the reckless nature of the Ultras. The fiery 
speeches by leaders such as Syed Jaafar Albar against PAP leaders were 
depicted as a prime example of how the Ultras systematically whipped up the 
emotion of the Singapore Malays and steer their emotional hatred towards the 
PAP and the Chinese. The more moderate UMNO leaders were also seen as 




aggressive communal direction. Even on the day of the procession itself, Othman 
Wok noted that UMNO leaders who were present at the Padang were giving 
inflammatory speeches to the UMNO contingent. His contacts from the UMNO-
owned Utusan Melayu were also behaving suspiciously as if they can “foretell” a 
violent clash due to break out, hours before the first clashes occurred198. Othman 
narrated having seen members of the UMNO contingent who were the first ones to 
start the violence. UMNO Ultras was portrayed by the dominant account as having 
systematically planned and organized the Riots and guilty of being the principal 
antagonist of the 1964 Racial Riots.  
In their defence, UMNO vehemently denied having planned the Riots and the 
leaders pointed the blame at the Indonesians for instigating the races against each 
other. Members of UMNO contingent who marched on the day noted that the first 
blow was delivered by unsavoury hooligans not affiliated to the party. Senior 
UMNO leaders also flatly dismissed the notion that UMNO had systematically 
organized the Riots. Tunku and Khir highlighted the fact that the Ultras were not as 
powerful and influential as they were made out to be and that the moderate 
factions within UMNO were the ones who controlled the party’s direction. They 
added that UMNO leaders were also caught by surprise when news of the Riots hit 
them.  
The grassroots accounts presented yet other forms of narratives on the causes of 
the Riots. Amongst those at the grassroots, majority of them believed that the 
Riots broke out spontaneously with no planning behind it. Cikgu Latiff echoed their 
sentiments when he presented a theory on the spontaneous mass effect of 
                                               




members in a religious procession that instinctively resorted to violent means 
when mocked by the Chinese onlookers. The grassroots’ accounts also showed 
that life went on as per normal in other parts of Singapore. The violence was 
largely confined to the southeastern parts of Singapore. Amongst those at the 
grassroots, majority of them had elaborated on how their interracial relationship 
with their acquaintances remained firm and cordial during the rioting period. 
Rationality overrides racialized emotion even when tension was at an all-time high. 
At the grassroots level, past interracial friendships and relations forged prior to the 
Riots held sway against primordial instinct. It was noted that interracial relationship 
amongst those at the grassroots level was positive before, during and after the 
Riots broke out.  
It is clear from this thesis that there are incongruencies between the dominant 
account and the alternative accounts pertaining to the causes of the Riots. The 
varying accounts confirm that the different groups viewed and remembered the 
Riots differently. The pursuance of the dominant narrative on the causes of the 
Riots raised some key problems which directly affected the nature of the bilateral 
relationship between Singapore and Malaysia in the present day context. This is 
especially so as the two primary political parties involved in the incident are still 
helming the governments in both countries, with PAP currently forming the 
government in Singapore, and UMNO leading the ruling coalition in Malaysia. 
Lee’s personal interpretation of the Riots in his memoir, which influenced the 
State’s account on the Riots, caused a stir across the Causeway. After it was 
released, prominent UMNO leaders were quick to criticize Lee’s interpretation of 
the book. The long serving Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed 




“Malaysian Malaysia” line and thus should assume responsibility for the outbreak 
of the Riots. Former Malaysian Information Minister Mohamad Rahmat said that 
Lee’s narrative showed that Singapore did not want to be on good terms with 
Malaysia and had tried on many occasions such as this to undermine Malaysia. 
The present Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak deemed the historical 
inaccuracies as a great sense of injustice and personal outrage. Lastly Syed 
Hamid Albar, the son of Syed Jaafar Albar, criticized Lee’s description of his father 
as being too one-sided without being fair in his complete assessment of the 
Riots199.  
Singapore’s relationship with Malaysia has always been fickle, at times they 
enjoyed very warm and cordial ties but at other times their relationship may be 
very testy. Some prominent incidents which tested the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries include the tussling over Pedra Branca and the conflicts 
pertaining to the issue of the supply of water from Malaysia to Singapore. From 
Singapore’s perspective, Malaysia is viewed as continually poised to exploit 
Singapore’s strategic vulnerability while from Malaysia’s point of view, Singapore’s 
economic success has generated a sense of hubris and a condescending attitude 
towards Malaysia, which is viewed in Kuala Lumpur as “racist based 
triumphalism”200. A recurring pattern of their bilateral ties regularly has one of them 
emphasizing their point in a particular contentious issue while vilifying the other; 
The Singapore State’s pursuance of the dominant account of the Riots in 
emphasizing and suppressing certain historical accounts to reflect badly on the 
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part of UMNO is an example of this. The nature of how the Ultras is portrayed as 
having systematically planned and instigated the Riots also has bearing on the 
effects and legacies of the Riots which will be explained in the next part of this 
chapter.  
3. Lessons for the next generation 
The accounts given by Lee in his memoir are reflected in themes which can be 
found in the Ministry of Education’s National Education programme. In a 
Secondary One Social Studies Textbook, the Alliance coalition was fingered as the 
principal party that had caused the outbreak of the 1964 Racial Riots. They were 
shown as being systematic in playing the racial card by whipping up the emotion of 
the Malay communities in Singapore201 . Themes such as racial harmony and 
ethnic fault lines were emphasized in the programme, designed to serve as 
valuable lessons for new generations of Singaporeans. The State even 
commemorates the anniversary of the Riots as Racial Harmony Day which was 
observed annually in all the public schools to remind students of the fragility of our 
interracial ties and not to take racial harmony for granted. This is despite the fact 
that the causes to the Riots can largely be attributed to political rather than racial 
motives. Accounts from the Australian diplomatic cables, however, which provide a 
categorical analysis on the origin of the Riots, give a different account of the Riots. 
William Pritchett, the Australian Deputy High Commissioner, portrayed Lee as 
being too opportunistic and aggressive thus making him complicit, in sharing part 
of the blame for the Riots. Lee and the PAP knew fully well how the political 
system in Malaysia was like even before Singapore merged with Malaysia. They 
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knew that the foundation of Malaysia’s politics was based on the premise of a 
bumiputera-favoured policy and a preference for non-confrontational backroom 
discussion between the political leaders on contentious issues. Therefore it is only 
natural for PAP and Lee to expect such a fierce reaction from UMNO and the 
Ultras when they adopted a strategy of publicly confronting UMNO on issues 
pertaining to UMNO’s communal approach to politics. By aggressively pursuing 
such a strategy, they are also guilty of engaging UMNO and the Ultras in a 
protracted political rivalry which charged up the general public. It was this highly-
charged atmosphere that set the mood for the day on 21st July 1964.    
Yet Lee’s portrayal of the Riots which highlighted the role of the racial chauvinists 
within the ranks of the UMNO Ultras highlighted such themes. The dominant 
narrative framed the Malays and Chinese as harbouring very strong primordial 
sense of identity and would instinctively flare up over any racial-based conflict 
involving both races.  Due to the perceived threats based on Singapore’s 
seemingly fragile society’s ethnic fault lines, the State had positioned race and 
religion as taboo subjects and acted as the sole authority in demarcating the out-
of-bound markers in discussion on such issues. The result is having a society 
embracing such a discourse without critically analysing the past historical 
examples used by the State to propagate such discourse in the first place.    
An example of how the Riots are being used as lessons in today’s context is in the 
case study of former opposition candidate, Tang Liang Hong. Then-Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong in the 1997 General Elections had labelled Tang as a Chinese 




hence, had to be prevented from entering parliament202. After the election, Tang 
faced defamatory suits filed by 11 PAP leaders who accused him of being a 
Chinese chauvinist and anti-Christian campaigner203. In an interview on the Riots 
with Othman Wok, Othman quoted on Tang during his concluding note. He 
labelled Tang as a dangerous ethnic chauvinist that is a divisive character who 
can stir up interracial tension. Drawing on the example of the Riots to highlight this 
point, he said that such ethnic chauvinists can easily instigate an outbreak of an 
interracial riot, especially as politicians are able to reach out to a large number of 
the population. However, based on the alternative accounts of the Riots, the use of 
the 1964 Racial Riots to illustrate how an ethnic chauvinist can easily instigate a 
massive interracial riot is misleading. While it is true that irresponsible politicians 
bent on securing votes would manipulate masses by playing the racial or religious 
cards such as the Ultras’ passionate emotive speeches that whipped out the 
sentiments of the masses, the Riots does not show that this will result in massive 
inter-communal fighting at the grassroots level. This thesis has shown that a 
critical analysis on the Riots may in fact prove otherwise. Amongst those at the 
grassroots level, majority of them had elaborated on how their interracial 
relationship with their acquaintances remained firm and cordial during the rioting 
period. Rationality prevailed even when tension was at an all-time high. At the 
grassroots level, past interracial friendships and relations forged prior to the Riots 
held sway against primordial instinct and political instigations. Evidence shows 
interracial relationships at the grassroots level was positive before, during and 
after the Riots broke out.  
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Secondary sources such as Foo Kim Leng also noted that while the whole country 
was put under curfew, the actual violence itself was localized, concentrated mainly 
in the southeastern part of Singapore. This account was corroborated by accounts 
from the grassroots, as almost none of those who lived in the non-hotspot areas 
had witnessed any form of violence during the period and their only memory of the 
Riots was staying at home because of the curfew. Therefore it is wrong to 
contextualize the Riots in today’s context in presenting lessons on the dangers of 
ethnic chauvinists who are able to instigate massive interracial riots in Singapore.  
Another example in illustrating the effects of uncritically subscribing to the thematic 
discourse extracted from the dominant narrative on the Riots is in the case of Amy 
Cheong. Cheong was an Assistant Director with the National Trades Union Board 
(NTUC) who was vilified by the public and labelled a racist for her online ranting on 
the noise caused by Malay weddings204. The speed in which she attained notoriety 
was alarming and she quickly turned into public enemy number one. She was 
eventually sacked and had to leave the country. The reaction from the public is 
reflective of how Singapore society deals with such incidents. The Singapore 
society grew up subscribing to the discourse on the existence of ethnic fault lines 
in our society which run so deep that any racist comment made has the potential 
to flare up and escalate into a massive riot. This thesis has shown that a critical 
analysis on the Riots may in fact prove otherwise. Despite the tumultuous contexts 
of the 1950s-1970s in Singapore when riots of a racial or religious nature were 
more frequent, the overall social fabric proved to be surprisingly rather resilient.   
                                               





In conclusion, the findings from this thesis contradict the dominant discourse which 
assumes the existence of deep ethnic fault lines which are inherent in our society. 
The State’s action of being selective of which type of historical facts and accounts 
to be included in the national historical discourse is problematic as it led to the 
adoption of such discourse. Based on the examples of Tang Liang Hong and Amy 
Cheong, the State selects past historical incidents such as the 1964 Racial Riots 
and uses it to highlight the “lessons” we can learn and not to repeat in the future. 
However the approach of using history to draw continuity to the present silences 
some accounts and narratives which prevents a holistic assessment of history.  
One key consequence of the findings of this thesis is to dilute the relevance and 
meaning of linking such communitarian “lessons” with selective pickings of past 
historical incidents. In the case of the Riots, it is true that there were racial 
chauvinists and irresponsible politicians who instigated the masses, but it is wrong 
to assume that there are deep ethnic fault lines in Singapore’s society that had 
contributed to the Riots. A deeper analysis of alternative accounts from secondary 
sources and those at the grassroots level had shown otherwise, as had been 
illustrated in this thesis.        
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